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Abstract 
In this paper I develop and analyze 20years of data on the economic performance of the 12 
regional corporations created by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA). 
The act was a radical departure from previous U.S. policy toward indigenous peoples. Alaska's 
75,000 Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians received almost $1 billion in cash and acquired clear title to 
more than 40 million acres of land, an area larger than New England. This wealth was vested in 
12 regional and almost 200 village-level business corporations. As a group, the 12 regional 
corporations lost 80 percent of their original cash endowment -- about $380 million -- in direct 
business operations between 1973 and 1993. But behind this poor overall financial performance 
is a surprising amount of cross-sectional variation. I first show that allocation of business assets 
to different economic sectors plays a statistically significant but empirically minor role in 
explaining this differential performance. I then construct panel data on shareholder employment, 
wages, and quasirents and test the hypothesis that the regional corporations traded off business 
profits for Native jobs. The data strongly reject this hypothesis. Quasirents from Native 
shareholder employment were important to only three firms -- the rest lost money without any 
countervailing employment. Case history evidence suggests that internal sharing networks and 
common preferences helped the high-employment firms to deliver both jobs and dividends. 
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1. Introduction 
 Many thousands of Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians used and occupied the land now known 
as Alaska for at least the past 8,000 years (Chance 1990). During the past century, European 
society finally encroached on these people, and by 1968 the Alaska Natives’ political struggle for 
a just settlement of their land claims was crystallized in the slogan “Take our Land, Take our 
Life.” The struggle was successful, at least in comparison to previous United States Indian 
policies.1 Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971, Alaska's 75,000 
Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians received almost $1 billion in cash and acquired clear title to more 
than 40 million acres of land -- an area larger than New England. 
 ANCSA was intended to be a development tool as much as a claims settlement,2 a way 
for one of America's poorest minority groups3 to escape from poverty on a self-determined path. 
In a deliberate repudiation of previous United States Indian policy based on reservations and 
federal oversight, the act vested the land and the money in Alaska Native business corporations, 
not tribes. Referring to his people’s historic reliance on whaling, one Inupiat Eskimo called these 
corporations the “New Harpoon.”4 
                                                 
1 See Appendix A for a brief review of the Alaska Natives’ land claims struggle and the passage of ANCSA. 
2 " 'The bill before you is not just a question of land,’ said John Sackett, an Athabascan Indian, as the U.S. Senate 
considered the initial settlement. ‘It is a grasp, a handhold for the development of our future.’ ” (Bernton 1992) 
3 In 1966 a front-page New York Times story reported: "The worst slums in the United States are not in the 
racially turbulent quarters of New York, Cleveland, Chicago or Los Angeles. By all available indices of poverty, 
they are sparsely strewn, like garbage on an ice floe, along the nation's desolate sea frontier with the the Soviet 
Union." (Bigart 1966) 
4Charlie Edwardsen, in Edwardsen (1974). 
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 In a previous paper (Colt 1999) I showed that the consolidated financial performance of 
the Alaska Native corporations over their first two decades was suprisingly poor. The twelve 
regional corporations lost about $380 million -- more than three quarters of their original cash 
endowment -- in business operations between 1973 and 1993. Only the one-time sale of old 
growth timber and other natural assets and a one-time tax windfall allowed them to report 
positive accounting income. 
 Behind this poor average performance, however, is a surprising amount of variation 
across corporations. Cumulative per capita dividends varied from zero to $17,000. The average 
annual accounting return on book equity was 3.9% for the consolidated group, but the range runs 
from -71% to +13%. And beyond financial returns, several corporations provided hundreds of 
high-wage jobs for their Native shareholders, while others provided none. 
 What accounts for this variation? Why have several corporations become largely 
moribund while others have produced growth, dividends and jobs in a difficult economic 
climate? I explore these questions using ideas from development economics and political 
economy to generate testable hypotheses about differential performance. I develop data on each 
firm's asset allocations, joint venture participation, and shareholder employment over time and 
exploit this temporal variation to augment the small cross-sectional sample. 
 The regional corporations made money in local village enterprises, but faced rapidly 
diminishing returns to investment in these very small markets. The evidence suggests that the 
Natives exploited their locational advantages in these businesses and handled the diminishing 
returns by respecting the limited size of the local markets within their own regions and not 
encroaching into the markets of other regions. In contrast, financial losses were large and 
widespread in statewide enterprises outside the oil industry, such as fishing, construction, real 
estate, and hotels. And in spite of the underlying strength of Alaska’s North Slope oil industry, 
petroleum-related investments produced mixed results. 
 There was wide variation among corporations due to management effects. By importing 
scarce management, joint ventures with established non-Native firms lost less money than 
wholly Native-owned operations. Controlling for this strategy, however, does little to reduce the 
importance of persistent, firm-specific fixed effects in explaining performance (Cockburn & 
Henderson 1996). 
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 Some have suggested that the corporations deliberately sacrificed profits to provide 
Native jobs. But counting the economic benefits of job creation changes the picture only slightly. 
Three corporations provided significant cash flows to their shareholders in the form of wages, 
while sacrificing little in the way of profits. In contrast, those who made the greatest financial 
losses produced little or no employment. These data are inconsistent with the hypothesis of an 
efficient trade-off of profits for wages. 
 Finally, the pattern of profits and losses provides mixed support for the concept of 
economic dualism (Todaro 1989) in a remote, resource-dependent region. The Alaska Natives 
gained control of land, natural resources, and capital, but could not parlay that control into profits 
and in fact suffered huge losses in the attempt. Modern sector enterprises provided jobs and 
sometimes profits, but were limited to a fixed pool of opportunities. Attempts to create new 
opportunities generally failed. 
 These results provide a quantitative basis for evaluating ANCSA as policy, and may be of 
interest to others engaged in the settlement of indigenous land claims.5 The Alaska experience 
provides insight into the process of place-based development in a remote regional economy. 
ANCSA corporations tried many of the same strategies that have been proposed, at one time or 
another, as answers to the problems of sustainable development in northern or remote regions. 
The large losses they suffered are a sobering lesson about the challenges inherent in this process. 
 The results may also hold lessons for Indian reservations, where the stubborn persistence 
of poverty has inspired much discussion about what tribes and governments can do to improve 
welfare. A central issue in these debates is whether aid should be directed towards individuals, 
tribes, or places (Cornell & Kalt 1992). The Alaska corporations tried all of these basic strategies 
to some degree, as well as different contracting relationships such as joint ventures, partnerships, 
and leases. Their experiences may provide lessons for other American Indians, especially those 
tribes with recent cash windfalls from gambling. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers background and motivates the inquiry. 
Section 3 considers economic dualism and asset allocation in a multi-sector context. Section 4 
considers firm-specific fixed effects and the use of the joint venture form to import scarce 
                                                 
5 Claims processes are underway at least in Australia (Case 1995), Canada (Nickerson 1998), New Zealand 
(Kalt, Joseph, Harvard University, personal communication, May 15, 1997), and Russia (Fischer, Victor, University 
of Alaska, personal communication, February 7, 1995). Other examples undoubtedly abound. 
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management skills. Section 5 considers employment as a substitute for profits. Section 6 
considers individual incentives and the internal political economy of Native corporations as a 
source of differential performance. Section 7 closes with conclusions. A historical appendix 
provides background on the Alaska Native peoples and their land claims struggle.  A data 
appendix provides further detail on the construction of the asset allocation and employment data 
set. 
2. Background and Motivation 
2.1. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) 
 ANCSA transferred more than 40 million acres of land and $962.5 million in cash to 
business corporations owned exclusively by Alaska Natives. The act established 12 regional 
corporations and approximately 200 village corporations. Every Alaska Native alive at the time 
of passage (December 17, 1971) became a voting shareholder in a regional business corporation 
operated under state law. Most Natives also owned part of a village corporation. Significantly, no 
one was allowed to sell their shares until 1991 at the earliest.6 Table 1 shows the wide variation 
in land areas and number of shareholders across regions. Appendix A provides a concise history 
of Alaska Native land claims and explains other legal aspects of ANCSA.  
TABLE 1: ALASKA NATIVE REGIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Regional Initial
and Village ANCSA Major
Number of Land Area Cash Natural Resource 
Name Shareholders (million acres) ($ million) Endowments
Ahtna 1,100 1.7 6.4
Aleut 3,249 1.6 19.5
Arctic Slope 3,738 5.1 22.5 potential oil and gas
Bristol Bay 5,200 3.0 32.5
Bering Straits 6,200 2.2 38.1
Calista 13,306 7.0 80.1
Chugach Natives 2,109 1.0 11.5 timber
Cook Inlet 6,553 2.5 34.4 known oil and gas
Doyon 9,061 12.5 53.4 potential minerals
Koniag 3,731 1.7 20.0
NANA 5,000 2.2 28.9 zinc-lead deposits
Sealaska 15,700 0.3 92.5 old-growth timber
Total 74,947 40.8 439.9  
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2.2. Overall Financial Performance 
 Because of several unique features of ANCSA, standard accounting measures are poor 
indicators of actual economic performance.  Reported accounting profits are a mixture of. asset 
sales, windfall gains from tax preferences, and other direct transfers, as well as productive 
economic activity (Colt 1999). 
 By breaking down accounting income flows into windfall transfers, natural resource asset 
sales, passive investments, and active business operations, I showed in a previous paper that the 
regional corporations lost more than $380 million in direct business operations.  The pattern of 
losses persisted over time.  Some corporations did better than others, but almost no one made 
money from active business.  Passive investments, -natural resource asset sales, and a special tax 
preference provided enough cash to cover these losses, to support corporate overhead, and to 
generate reported net income of $596 million between 1974 and 1993.  However, after adjusting 
for inflation, real financial wealth was barely preserved, and natural resources were depleted. 
2.3. Variation in Dividends and Jobs 
 All corporations faced similar initial conditions, including the general stability of the 
surrounding economy and the statewide (and worldwide) menu of investment opportunities circa 
1972. But there were also important differences in natural resource endowments, in the size of 
local markets, and in human capital and cultural background. 
 Table 2 summarizes the wide variation in regional corporation performance that 
developed during their first 20 years. Cumulative per capita dividends varied from zero to 17,000 
dollars. Per capita book equity at the end of 1993 varied by a factor of 100. The average annual 
accounting return on book equity was 3.9% for the consolidated7 group, but the range runs from 
+13% to minus 71%. 
 The cross-sectional variation in returns is not due to unequal endowments or windfall 
transfers. Column 4 of the table shows that when natural resource rents and tax windfalls are 
removed from income, the average "nonwindfall" return on equity drops to -3.0% and the range 
remains essentially the same, running from -67% to +7% (Colt 1999). The variation also persists 
over time: The time trend of annual “between” variances is slightly negative but insignificant. 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Despite subsequent amendments to ANCSA that allow corporations to make their stock tradable, no group of 
shareholders has approved such a step, so stock sales remain prohibited as of January 2001. 
7 equivalent to a weighted average of individual returns with the weights equal to relative amounts of equity. 
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The typical cross-sectional variance of nonwindfall returns in any given year exceeds the typical 
variance over time for any given corporation by about 30%. 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF VARIATION IN FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Cumulative Average(1) Average(1)
Real Per capita Reported Nonwindfall(2)
per capita Book Equity Return on Return on
Corporation Name Dividends at 1993 Equity Equity
1976-1993 1976-1993 1976-1993
(1993$) (1993$)
Ahtna 3,269 21,965 4.3% 1.8%
Aleut 661 4,282 -11.9% -13.0%
Arctic Slope 4,918 25,170 27.2% 2.8%
Bristol Bay 2,554 9,788 2.1% -0.7%
Bering Straits 166 4,693 -48.7% -66.9%
Calista 65 668 -24.6% -28.0%
Chugach Natives 847 (1,180) 4.0% -13.4%
Cook Inlet 16,952 66,453 16.8% 7.3%
Doyon 2,603 15,573 12.6% 0.8%
Koniag 0 6,215 4.8% -12.2%
NANA 3,770 10,017 4.8% 0.5%
Sealaska 5,366 13,489 10.2% -3.2%
Overall (consolidated) 3,721 14,412 5.4% -3.0%
Unweighted Average(3) 3,431 14,761 0.1% -10.4%
Notes:
(1) Arithmetic average of annual returns
(2) Adjusted to remove tax loss sales and natural resource rents
    from sales of assets not carried on the books
(3) Simple average of each corporation's quantity, without weighting by equity or number of
     shareholders  
 
 For many Alaska Natives jobs are more important than cash dividends. Table 3 shows 
that in 1991 two corporations managed to employ more than 20% of their shareholders, a notable 
achievement considering that both of them are in especially remote areas. Others generated only 




TABLE 3: REGIONAL CORPORATION EMPLOYMENT IN 1991 
Share- % of
Corporate Joint holder shareholders
Corporation Offices Ventures Subsidiaries Total Employment employed
Ahtna 25 250 100 375 55 5%
Aleut 9 13 176 198 5 0%
Arctic Slope 53 247 2,162 2,462 827 22%
Bristol Bay 11 0 300 311 7 0%
Bering Straits 12 0 3 15 9 0%
Calista n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Chugach 20 75 60 155 39 2%
Cook Inlet 66 434 722 1,222 120 2%
Doyon 24 156 0 180 69 1%
Koniag 7 0 0 7 4 0%
NANA 33 1,408 609 2,050 978 20%
Sealaska (1) n/a n/a n/a 560 n/a n/a
Total 260 2,583 4,132 7,535 2,113 3%  
2.4. Anecdotal Evidence on Performance8 
 Behind the statistics are some striking and sometimes tragic stories. The following 
sketches provide a sample. 
 Bering Straits. Located just miles from Russian Siberia, the Bering Straits region is 
devoid of obvious economic opportunities other than sporadic gold mining. Undeterred by these 
bleak conditions, the Bering Straits Native Corporation simply bought up a raft of existing 
statewide enterprises in mobile home sales, real estate, banking, and other industries. To finance 
these acquisitions, they used not only their own share of ANCSA cash payments, but also the 
money designated for the village corporations in their region. A Bering Straits board member 
funneled all of the money into one co-mingled account in a Fairbanks bank. 
 While the bank earned more than $1 million in fees from all the transactions, Bering 
Straits lost more than $55 million by 1988, an amount which greatly exceeded its own ANCSA 
cash assets. When the villages found out that their money was also gone they sued the company, 
and both sued the bank. The bank failed and the FDIC assumed a debt to the villages. The 
corporation entered chapter 11 bankruptcy with its own villages as the chief creditors. The sale 
of tax losses saved Bering Straits from liquidation and after more costly litigation with its own 
villages it signed over all of its subsurface ANCSA lands to them. 
                                                 
8 This section relies heavily on Strohmeyer (1993). 
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 Just to the north of the Bering Straits region, things turned out quite differently for the 
Nana Corporation. From the start, Nana leaders sought to cast the corporation as an extended 
family of shareholders, a source of cultural pride and stability during the turbulent oil pipeline 
construction era. In 1980, they quietly merged the regional corporation with its 10 constituent 
village corporations. At the same time, they put their initial business investments close to the 
huge cash flows generated by the North Slope oil fields, operating the water, sewer, and electric 
utilities on the slope and using joint ventures to enter the lucrative construction camp catering 
business. 
 While these early ventures produced jobs and modest profits, Nana methodically selected 
lands containing the world's largest zinc deposit. Rather than simply auction the mineral rights, 
however, they negotiated for years with potential partners and finally extracted a broad array of 
employment and training benefits from Canadian mining giant Cominco. By 1996 Nana 
shareholders held almost 50% of all mine jobs. Never a big producer of cash dividends, Nana 
focused on employment. Through a combination of break-even local business, the zinc mine, and 
cautious expansion into tourism, the corporation was able by 1991 to employ almost 1,000 
shareholders, or 25% of the working-age population. 
 The Calista Corporation is one of the largest, with more than 13,000 shareholders 
scattered among 50 villages along the tundra-covered banks of the Yukon and Kuskokwim 
rivers. There are no roads and few trees in the area, and unemployment hovered at around 60 
percent in 1971. Vowing to "pursue every available employment [sic] for shareholders," 9 the 
new corporation plowed the first receipts of its $80 million dollars of ANCSA cash payments 
into a new construction business in Anchorage. Lacking construction projects, Calista built a 
huge new downtown hotel that was more than $30 million over budget before it was half-
finished. It bought fish from shareholders at inflated prices and resold them into the world 
market at a loss. It poured $6 million into an artificial crabmeat plant in Washington. 
 Led by the hotel, which was finally sold at a loss of more than $40 million, all of these 
businesses failed miserably. By 1988 Calista had lost more than $98 million in business 
operations and its shareholder equity was down to only $400 per person. Sales of tax losses and 
shared revenues from other regions' oil and timber sales have kept Calista marginally solvent 
                                                 
9  Calista Corporation, 1974 Annual Report. 
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since then. In 1991 the corporation employed less than 10 people. In 1993 the president was 
arrested in the Anchorage airport with a suitcase full of illegally hunted geese. 
 Unlike Calista, Anchorage-based Cook Inlet Region Incorporated was able to select 
known oil and gas reserves as part of its land entitlement. But because the State of Alaska had 
already taken much of the land in the Anchorage region, Cook Inlet went back to Congress in 
1976 and pleaded hardship. In exchange for giving up several million acres of land, they got 
bidding rights at federal auctions of surplus properties, including military bases and the FDIC's 
inventory of real estate from failed banks. During the next 20 years the corporation used these 
rights to purchase more than $200 million worth of real estate, or more than 7 times their original 
ANCSA cash entitlement. 
 Cook Inlet parlayed these assets and its oil and gas earnings into a string of broadcasting 
acquisitions throughout the U.S. with partners who could take advantage of the Natives' minority 
status to gain preferences from the FCC. By 1988 the corporation had earned more than $260 
million, more than four times as much as the combined total of the other 11 regional 
corporations.  
3. Asset Allocation and Dualism 
 The anecdotes above suggest that the Native corporations faced a real challenge in 
deciding where to invest their money. This problem of sectoral choice is a major one for a small 
group that receives a sudden increase in its wealth endowment. It is particularly important when 
the endowment is vested in a corporate organization whose ostensible purpose is to pursue 
investment and production on a scale that individuals could not undertake on their own, and 
when there is a presumption that the economic activities are to be largely place-based, i.e., within 
Alaska. 
 To generate testable propositions about the importance of sectoral choice I use the 
concept of economic dualism, which Todaro (1989) defines as “a persistent set of undesirable 
differences between two sectors.” The dualism paradigm takes at least some factor prices and 
factor proportions as essentially exogenous. If wages differ among sectors and fixed proportions 
create a queue for high-wage jobs, then a Native group may wish to invest capital to allow its 
people to enter the high-wage sector. But this strategy could be constrained by a key feature of 
the arctic economy: random, fixed deposits of natural resources. If resource deposits limit the 
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size of the "modern" sector and capital is a complement to this fixed factor, then embedded 
capital can earn positive economic profit while marginal capital may make losses no matter 
where it is invested. 
 This multisector approach can generate hypotheses that might be logically untenable in a 
more aggregated growth model. In particular, it is easier to justify a persistent difference between 
prevailing modern sector wages set in urban labor markets and the low opportunity cost of 
Native labor in a remote village. This opportunity cost of village labor is often set at the margin 
by some combination of subsistence hunting and fishing opportunities and transfer payments 
(Knapp and Huskey 1988). With significant quasi-rents embodied in modern sector wages, the 
pursuit of modern economy market share is a form of rent seeking. It is a good strategy for a 
small group with political clout, even though it does nothing to increase overall output (Rama 
1993). 
3.1. Dualism as a Development Paradigm 
 Lewis (1954) was one of the first to use a two-sector model in which wages are not 
equalized between sectors. In his framework the size of the modern, high-wage sector is limited 
over time by the supply of capital and at any moment by the necessity of paying the high modern 
wage. In the traditional sector the marginal product of labor is zero and each worker receives the 
average product as a subsistence wage. Harris & Todaro (1970) generated an urban 
unemployment equilibrium by equalizing the expected urban sector wage and the low but certain 
traditional wage. Like Lewis, they simply assumed the existence of a parametric urban wage and 
then traced its effects and policy implications. 
 Although the concept of a dual economy has proven difficult to formalize, the idea of 
dualism remains useful in studies of the Arctic, where unemployment and underemployment are 
persistent facts of life (Alaska Federation of Natives 1991). First, it informs the observation of 
sometimes widely differing technologies in use in what appears to be the same economy. 
Second, it provides a useful basis for generating testable empirical propositions. Perhaps for 
these reasons, concepts of dualism and conflict between the "modern" and "traditional" 
economies are a common thread running through applied research on northern remote regions 
(Huskey and Morehouse 1992). 
 Notions of dualistic development naturally emerge from the geographical juxtaposition of 
ultra-modern resource extraction and primitive traditional subsistence that typifies the remote 
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circumpolar north. However, the coexistence of such different activities in space need not require 
the conclusion that the two sectors constitute a "persistent set of undesirable differences," to use 
Todaro's phrase. Human capital theory provides a direct and efficient explanation for the 
existence of apparently dual labor markets. Complex resource extraction projects may import all 
of their labor at high wages simply because local people do not have the required skills.  
Dualism in the arctic: evidence from Canada 
 Stabler (1989) tested for dualism in Canada's Northwest Territories by analyzing 
differential employment patterns conditional on simple measures of human capital. As an 
example, he found that among employed male high school graduates aged 15-24, 65% of the 
non-Natives had jobs in the primary sector, while only 57% of the Natives held such jobs. 
Overall, his conclusions were mixed: Although equally experienced or educated Natives have 
lower participation rates than whites in what he called “primary” jobs, the difference goes away 
as the required human capital increases.  
 Although Stabler lacks a detailed model of dualism and hence has no compelling 
alternative hypotheses, his formal tests corroborate a long anecdotal history of discrimination 
against northern Native people. In light of this evidence, one must take seriously the notion that 
individual Alaska Natives faced fundamental difficulties participating in the modern resource-
extraction sector of the Alaska economy. Even if there is a solid basis in human capital 
differences for differential employment patterns, the simple existence of the two very different 
types of activities may lead to important strategy considerations for a Native corporation 
dedicated to long run development. 
The modern economy in Alaska: capital-limited or resource-limited? 
 It is clear from the historical record that Native leaders and policymakers had a notion of 
dualism in mind when framing ANCSA.10 The corporation was viewed as the overt means by 
which the Natives could enter the modern economy. It is also likely that many participants had a 
Lewis-type model in the back of their minds. That is, capital was seen as the bottleneck factor 
limiting development of modern, high-wage enterprise in rural Alaska.  
                                                 
10 See, e.g., the extensive congressional hearing records surrounding ANCSA (U.S. Senate, 1968, 1970) or the 
transcripts of the retrospective inquiry conducted by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (1975). 
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 In contrast to this Lewis-type model where capital is the limiting factor, I will also 
consider a resource-limited economic base model. In this model, the supply of capital is 
unlimited in response to adequate rates of return, but the supply of profitable opportunities is 
strictly limited by natural resource deposits.  
3.2.  A Simple Model of Investment in the Remote Northern Economy 
 To begin, I make the following baseline assumptions about the arctic economy as 
epitomized by Alaska. There is a modern economy and a traditional or subsistence/transfer 
economy. In the modern economy agents continuously exhaust all opportunities for earning 
economic profits through direct resource extraction and provision of associated support services. 
This economy is tightly integrated with national and global markets, and responds quickly to 
changes in world prices of goods and factors. Within the modern economy, it is also useful to 
distinguish between existing oil development and production from North Slope fields, which I 
will call the oil sector, and the rest of the modern economy, which I will call the statewide sector. 
Note that the modern sector includes investments in processing natural resources, such as 
minerals and timber, but excludes the simple sale of these assets in situ, which activity merely 
earns rents for the owner. Because the Native Corporations did not buy the land, I treat natural 
resource asset sales as one-time cash windfalls, and exclude them when calculating profits. 
 The traditional economy includes hunting and trapping, small-scale fish harvesting, and 
small-scale local services. It is limited at the extensive margin by the fish and wildlife base and 
the amount of government transfers flowing to rural areas (Knapp and Huskey 1988). I use the 
term local sector to refer to the opportunities for corporate business activity tied to the traditional 
economy. 
 These definitions are admittedly vague, and the proper boundaries between the sectors 
are ultimately a subject for empirical inquiry. But with the definitions in place, several 
fundamental questions can be posed: Which sectors offer the best returns to the aspiring Native 
corporation? Are the returns in each sector the same across corporations? Which matters more, 
asset allocation to the right sector or management skill within a sector? Which sectors can be 
tapped for Native jobs? To give these questions empirical content, I use the following very 
simple asset allocation model. 
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The null hypothesis: equal returns in all sectors 
 Suppose there are only four places to invest: external financial capital markets (the 
PASSIVE sector); the modern oil sector (the OIL sector), the modern non-oil economy (the 
STATEWIDE sector) and strictly local business supported by the traditional sector (the LOCAL 
sector). Then Native corporation i's ex post realized profit in year t from invested capital is given 
by the following accounting identity:  
 
 π it ≡ αit PASSIVEit + β1it OILit + β2it STATEWIDEit +β3it LOCALit (1) 
 
where PASSIVEit + OILit +  STATEWIDEit + LOCALit ≡ 1 are fractions of total assets deployed 
in each sector and αit , β1it , β2it and β3it are the realized rates of return in each sector for 
corporation i in year t. Although (1), with all its subscripts, holds as an identity, it can be used to 
test hypotheses about Native corporations and possible dualism in their economic environment. 
If the economy is in a unified efficient equilibrium, then the marginal risk-adjusted returns in all 
sectors are equal. Although this does not necessarily mean that the average returns are equal, if 
the Native corporation is small relative to the economy, then all of its investments can be 
considered marginal. Thus, a useful null hypothesis is that the returns to all sectors are constant 
over time, constant across firms, and equal to each other:  
 
H0: αit = αjs = α ;  β1it =β1js = β1 ; ...etc.,  
 and α = β1 = β2 = β3 
Unequal returns across sectors 
 As a first alternative to the null hypothesis of equal returns, the capital-limited Lewis-
type model says that profitable projects abound. Since all Native corporations received equal 
amounts of capital per capita, they should all develop equally. Indeed, because in the Lewis story 
the traditional economy has been historically starved of capital, the marginal product of capital is 
high in the local sector. Under asymmetric information banks in distant urban centers will be less 
willing to lend to the rural periphery, thus passing up viable projects. Transferring wealth to the 
local people brings capital to the agents with the private information about how best to use it. 
The corporations from these poorer, remote areas should do better. In the modern statewide 
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sector, Native firms can also earn normal profits (and generate employment at market wages) 
from modest investments at the margin, such as buying and expanding an existing fish 
processing plant or building a new hotel. The profit-maximizing Native corporation will invest 
actively in each of the oil, statewide, and local sectors until the marginal project yields the [risk-
adjustd] rate of return in the passive sector. The capital-limited model implies:  
H1 (Capital-limited modern economy): The returns in the statewide and 
local sectors equal or exceed those from passive investment. β2 = β3 ≥ α . 
 A second alternative is generated by the following stylized version of a resource-limited 
model. At any time t there is a fixed number of viable large-scale resource extraction projects. 
Each resource project may generate inframarginal rents. The rents may be captured by 
landowners, government, labor, or owners of capital. Under the assumption of fixed-proportions 
production technology, the number of jobs is strictly limited by the amount of physical capital 
invested and ultimately by the number of viable projects. Finally, almost all inputs (capital, 
labor, services) used in the direct resource extraction activities are purchased through long-term 
contract rather than on competitive spot markets. 
 The resource-limited model says that, absent increases in the resource base, there are no 
positive-NPV projects at the margin anywhere in the economy. What looks like capital starvation 
in the traditional economy is actually a rational response to rapidly decreasing marginal 
productivity. The only ways for a Native group to grow its GDP are 1) to discover and develop 
new resource extraction projects on their own lands or 2) to usurp rents from existing markets by 
stealing market share. The Native corporation facing this situation must compete in the business 
and political arena for access to the rationed contracts offered by the major oil companies and 
their prime contractors. The barriers to entry are largely political. Of course, a third option for 
increasing group welfare is passive external investment. This provides dividend income ("GNP" 
as opposed to "GDP"), but without the benefits of employment, human capital development, and 
learning by doing. 
 In a resource-limited world, the average return to oil sector investment may contain some 
rents and exceed passive financial returns, but such investments are rationed. Any investments in 
the non-oil statewide sector or the traditional sector will make economic losses. The resource-
limited model implies: 
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H2 (Resource-limited modern economy): β1  > α and β2 ≈ β3  < α. The 
returns to oil exceed those from passive investment, but returns from 
statewide and local investment are less than passive returns. 
The regression equation 
 Under the unified economy hypothesis and neglecting risk premia,11 (1) becomes a 
regression equation with testable restrictions: 
 
 ROE it = α PASSIVEit + β1 OILit + β2 STATEWIDEit +β3 LOCALit + εit ; (2) 
 
with β1 = β2 = β3 =α   as the testable hypothesis that all sectors yield equal returns. To test 
hypotheses about unequal returns, I estimate equation (2) with two minor adjustments. First, I 
add an additional sector, PUBWORKS, to capture investments made by the Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation in order to complete large, lucrative public construction projects for the 
North Slope Borough.12 These projects were financed by billions of dollars of property taxes 
levied on the North Slope oilfields. No other regional corporation had access to this type of 
opportunity, so I treat it as a separate sector. Second, to make the interpretation of the 
coefficients more straightforward I add and subtract the term α (1 - PASSIVE) from the right side 
of (2) and rearrange terms. I measure the overall rate of return πit as ROEit , the nominal return 
on book equity excluding windfalls.13 The resulting regression equation is: 
 ROE it =   α  + γ1 OILit  
  + γ2  STATEWIDEit  
  + γ3  LOCALit  
  + γ4  PUBWORKSit  + εit (3) 
 The constant term α measures the baseline return to passive investment. The regression 
coefficients γ1 = (β1 - α),  γ2 =(β2 - α), etc. on the active asset shares measure the differential 
returns to those sectors over and above the baseline passive return. The t-statistics on each 
                                                 
11 It makes most sense to account for risk premia when interpreting the coefficients rather than imposing 
additional restrictions on the model. 
12 A borough in Alaska is equivalent to a county elsewhere in the U.S. 
13 The adjustments to remove windfalls are significant and are discussed in Colt (1999). 
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coefficient are test statistics for hypotheses of the form β1 > α. These hypotheses compare active 
returns to passive returns. 
3.3. The Asset Allocation Model: Identification, Data and Results 
Identification Issues 
 Because the asset allocation fractions are chosen by management in an effort to maximize 
some objective function, there is a potential endogeneity problem if the choice of projects in any 
given year is a function of the actual returns from the project. Projects are chosen prior to their 
actual financial return becoming known, but if returns are correlated over time, managers can 
potentially make choices based on actual returns. If these feedback effects are strong, the 
coefficients estimated in (3) will be biased versions of the true average returns to sectors. 
 I address this problem in two complementary ways. First, I assume that asset allocations 
to the OIL, LOCAL, and PUBWORKS sectors are largely exogenous. Since it was fairly obvious 
that contracting with the major oil companies was lucrative work, Native firms got what oil-
related contracts they could. The contracts were arguably rationed by political means and secured 
through political skill. Sometimes lawsuits were used to secure them.14 In other cases firms came 
up with novel ways to tap the rents from the industry.15 In a similar vein, local business 
opportunities were quickly seized by several corporations, but the size of the market was quite 
limited. (In many cases the ANCSA village corporations took these opportunities.) In summary, I 
assume that exogenous endowments and constraints were mainly responsible for the allocations 
to these sectors. 
 The second part of my approach to identification is to generate an instrument for the 
STATEWIDE sector asset allocation fraction. The exogeneity assumption is less reasonable for 
asset allocations to this sector. The menu of opportunities here was broader and entry was 
politically easy. Clearly managers were more free to choose projects on the basis of expected 
economic benefits. The corporations' persistent losses suggests that they were unable to choose 
                                                 
14 Ahtna Corporation fought hard for maintenance contracts related to the Trans-Alaska oil pipeline, arguing that 
they had been promised such work as a quid pro quo for supporting the project. (Ahtna 1977 Annual Report). The 
pipeline traversed Ahtna lands. 
15 While other Native firms were struggling to land oil-related construction contracts, Nana corporation entered 
the electric, water, and sewer business on the North Slope oilfields. 
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these projects based on their actual profits. It seems clear, however, that they could and did 
choose projects based on their expected employment benefits. 
 The instrument STATEHAT is a fitted value for STATEWIDE from the following 
regression: 
 
 STATEWIDEit = .715 - .0000025 NEEDit  
     (.026)  (.000001) 
  + .00038 OPPORTUNITYit  - .139 NOLFRACit  
       (.000018)     (.057) 
  +γt+ εit         (4) 
 
The variable NEED is real per capita income in corporation region i in year t. It captures (with its 
negative-signed coefficient) the intensity of pressure on management to "do something" to 
promote development . The variable OPPORTUNITY is total real private sector income for the 
region divided by the number of Native shareholders. It excludes government wages and is 
intended to capture the perceived size of the corporation's opportunity set. NOLFRAC is the 
current year’s windfall cash from tax loss sales expressed as a fraction of year-end assets. It 
captures the exogenous decline in the statewide sector asset share that occurred during the years 
of tax loss sales. The large cash inflows from the sales were placed in passive investment, 
driving down the statewide sector fraction. The γt are time shocks. 
 The coefficients in (4) are all highly significant. Figure 1 shows the negative relationship 
between per capita regional income and the actual and fitted values of the STATEWIDE asset 
fraction. 
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FIGURE 1: ACTUAL STATEWIDE ASSET ALLOCATIONS (STATEWIDE)  
AND FITTED INSTRUMENT VALUES (STATEHAT) AS A FUNCTION 
 OF PER CAPITA REGIONAL INCOME (NEED). 
rpcpinc





regional per capita personal income (NEED) 
 
I use the instrument STATEHAT to check the robustness of the financial returns results presented 
in this section. In section 5, below, I use the instrument in all specifications involving wages and 
quasirents. 
The data 
 I estimate equation (3) using pooled data for N=12 corporations over T=17 years. I 
constructed the data on asset allocation from accounting data in annual reports. The data measure 
the assets deployed at the beginning of the year for which the return is measured. The data 
appendix discusses the allocation process and the operational definitions of the sectors in more 
detail. 
 Figure 2 summarizes the time path of the data. There are three important patterns to note. 
First, in 1980 there was a large increase in passive holdings because the bulk of the ANCSA cash 
settlement payments were actually made in that year. During the next six years, this cash was 
deployed into active business. Second, from 1986 through 1990 there were numerous write-
downs of these physical assets and cash infusions from windfall tax loss sales, both of which 
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served to shift the mix of asset holdings towards cash and securities. Third, the figure clearly 
shows how the local sector allocation was never very large to begin with and steadily declined 
over time. 





































 Figure 3 summarizes the data in cross-section, showing the average (over time) asset 
allocation fractions for each corporation. Of course these summaries hide a great deal of change 
within each group over time. Still, the figure shows that there was substantial cross-sectional 
variation. Overall, there appear to be reasonable degrees of freedom in both dimensions. 
 Analysis of individual corporations and years strongly suggests that the disturbances are 
heteroskedastic (even though earnings are normalized by using rates of return) and correlated 
across corporations due to common time shocks. The heteroskedasticity arises because some 
corporations experienced periods of very low equity, leading to extremely volatile measures of 
ROE during those periods. Others used aggressive accounting procedures that added volatility to 
earnings. I test for this error structure using a Breusch-Pagan LM test (Greene 1993, p. 454) and 
correct for it using feasible GLS with estimated covariances across groups. 
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FIGURE 3: AVERAGE ASSET ALLOCATION BY CORPORATION 

































































Asset Allocation Regression Results  
 Table 4 presents the asset allocation regression using GLS.16 Columns 1 and 2 show the 
basic results. Columns 3 and 4 are robustness checks discussed below. The estimated return to 
passive investment shown in panel A is a reasonable 6.7%. In panel B, column 1 shows the 
differential returns to active investment as specified in equation (3). Investments in the oil sector, 
for example, produced estimated returns 6.8 percentage points below the baseline passive 
returns. The statewide sector provided an estimated differential return of -26.7%. The returns are 
all significantly different (at 5%) from passive returns. Column 2 of panel B restates the 
estimated coefficients as average absolute returns and shows the estimated standard errors of 
these constructed coefficients. These provide test statistics against the less interesting null 
hypotheses that the returns in each sector are zero. 
                                                 
16 The LM test confirming XC correlation is highly significant (χ2(66) = 99.6) and the efficiency gains over OLS 
are large. The magnitude of all coefficients is reduced from the OLS estimates as the more volatile data are damped 
by the GLS weights. In particular the differential return on statewide investment changes from -45% to -27% as the 
volatile data from the highly unprofitable Bering Straits Corporation are downweighted by GLS. 
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TABLE 4: ESTIMATED AVERAGE RETURNS IN EACH SECTOR 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
estimation method: FGLS FGLS IV FGLS
dep. var. =
net income / assets
A. Absolute Return to Passive investment:
Passive Investment .067* .067* .043* .054*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010)
B. Differential and Absolute
Returns to Active Investment in: Differential Absolute Absolute Absolute
Oil sector -.068* -.001 .130* -.015
(OIL) (0.035) (0.028) (0.038) (0.022)
Statewide sector -.267* -.200* -.128* -.122*
(STATEWID or  STATEHAT) (0.024) (0.016) (0.030) (0.008) 
Local sector .148* .215* .089 .014
(LOCAL) (0.069) (0.068) .100 (0.047)
Local public works .526* .592* .629* .477*
(PUBWORKS) (0.145) (0.148) (0.158) (0.095)
notes: Differential return is over and above return to passive investment.
Absolute return = passive return plus differential return.
Pooled sample of  N=12 corporations over T=17 years.
Estimated by GLS with correction for groupwise heteroskedasticity
and cross-sectional correlation. Standard errors in parentheses.
IV estimates in column 3 use fitted value for fraction of assets in statewide investments.
nonwindfall return on book equity




 All of the estimated active sector investment returns are somewhat surprising. The 
differential return to oil is negative and the absolute return is zero, contradicting the popular view 
that Natives made money in the oil service business. The negative sign of the statewide sector 
returns is not surprising given the well-known business failures, but the magnitude is remarkable. 
So too is the large magnitude -- +52% -- of the differential returns to local public works. These 
are the rents that Arctic Slope Corporation earned from its monopoly on regional government 
construction contracts funded by oil property taxes. 
 Most surprising, however, is the +14.8% estimated differential return to local sector 
investments. This is more than 40 percentage points higher than the return to statewide sector 
investments. The estimate casts serious doubt on the conventional wisdom that there are no good 
investments in the local private economy. It also raises the question of why a higher share of 
assets was not invested in the local sector. One explanation for both the high returns and the low 
investment shares is that the local markets offered lucrative but very limited opportunities. 
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Because these markets were isolated, the diminishing returns were apparent to all, preventing 
overcapacity. Fixed setup and transport costs can explain why these locational rents were not 
competed away. 
 The explanatory power of this model is not great: the R2 using OLS is only .12. Still, the 
coefficients are large and significant, while the addition of time trends, time dummies, and 
proxies for the overall health of the Alaska economy all yield insignificant coefficients. Taken 
together, the estimates suggest that the set of profitable opportunities was very limited; that the 
Native corporations correctly observed this fact in their own local markets; and that, as a group, 
they failed to appreciate it for statewide investments. The result was a long string of business 
losses. 
Robustness Checks 
 Column 3 of Table 4 uses the instrument STATEHAT in place of STATEWIDE. The 
pattern of the IV results is not very different from the basic GLS results in column 2, but the 
magnitude of the returns is attenuated. The losses on statewide investments average only -12.8% 
and the return to OIL jumps up. 
 Column 4 provides another check of the results by using net income divided by total 
assets as the dependent variable. Total assets were far more stable than equity during the early 
years when many corporations had wild swings in the return on equity simply because their 
equity was so low. Since the numerator remains the same, all coefficients should be scaled down 
somewhat. The very low coefficients on the OIL and LOCAL sectors in column 4 suggest that 
these estimates in the basic equation are in fact being influenced by extreme values from data 
points with low equity. In particular, the high LOCAL sector coefficient in columns 1 and 2 could 
be due to the fact that allocations to this sector were high during the same early years when the 
equity base was very low. 
Summary of Asset Allocation Tests 
 In this section I considered the Natives' asset allocation problem in a multi-sector world. 
The null hypothesis that all sectors are in a unified equilibrium yielding equal returns to capital is 
strongly rejected by the data. Alternative hypothesis H1 said that capital is the limiting factor for 
growth of the modern sector and that the Alaska Natives, with their new supplies of capital, 
could find many profitable projects in all sorts of industries throughout the state. The data 
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strongly reject this hypothesis for the oil and statewide sectors. The return in the statewide 
modern sector was hugely negative (minus 27%), and the return in the oil sector was essentially 
zero. 
 Alternative H2 said that fixed resource deposits limit growth and that the only way to 
make money in active business is to steal market share in an existing oil-related industry. The 
results support the resource-limited hypothesis for the statewide and oil sectors. 
 Finally, the surprising positive estimated average return of 21.5% in the local sector is 
consistent with elements of both alternatives. The high return suggests that the local areas were 
initially starved for capital, but the very limited scope of investment in this sector suggests that 
this need was quickly met, leaving no room for further profitable expansion.17 
 Overall, the concept of undesirable dualism is not well supported by these tests. The 
Alaska Natives gained control of land, natural resources, and capital, but could not parlay that 
control into profits and in fact suffered huge losses in the attempt. This outcome is consistent 
with Knowler's (1989) findings that absentee ownership of natural resources in Canada's Yukon 
has advantages for local people because nonwage income is less stable than wage income. 
Absentee ownership exports this volatility to other places. In contrast, the ANCSA corporations 
may have imported the volatility of shaky statewide ventures into their home regions. 
4. Management Effects and Joint Venture Participation 
 In the previous section I considered investment opportunities as technologically fixed, 
with each yielding up a predetermined level of profits. Yet in spite of their willingness to 
accumulate factors of production and to deploy these factors in all sectors of the surrounding 
economy, most ANCSA Native corporations still lost large amounts of money. The 
circumstantial evidence is very strong that management skill was a critical scarce resource 
affecting economic success. 
 I now focus on the corporations as business firms and consider internal performance and 
the evidence for strong management effects. My approach follows that of Cockburn & 
                                                 
17 Another, complementary explanation for the declining asset allocations to this sector is that the village 
corporations took over production to meet local demands. There is much anecdotal evidence about village 
corporation control of fuel dealerships, hardware stores, electric utilities, and other basic services that supports this 
view. 
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Henderson (1996), who found persistent and large firm-specific fixed effects among 
pharmaceutical firms engaged in competitive research races. 
 In this section I test two broad hypotheses about the importance of management as a 
scarce factor. First, I test for the extent and magnitude of management fixed effects by allowing 
firm-specific returns in the statewide sector of the asset allocation model. Second, I test for the 
effectiveness of the joint venture as a solution to the agency problem of importing scarce 
management while maintaining Native control of the corporation. 
4.1.  Management Effects in the Asset Allocation Model 
 The anecdotal evidence suggests that some corporations -- like Cook Inlet -- did 
relatively well in many sectors, while others -- like Bering Straits -- did poorly. The broad 
hypothesis that management matters more than sectoral allocation can be stated as: 
H3.(Importance of management). The variation across corporations in 
rates of return for any one sector greatly exceeds the variation of common 
returns across sectors. 
 The simplest way to capture unobserved management effects on returns is to allow a full 
set of firm-specific returns to each sector.18 The regression model of equation (3) then becomes a 
set of 12 seemingly unrelated regressions, one for each corporation. Although this completely 
unrestricted model could be estimated as a stacked SUR system, there are not enough degrees of 
freedom in the data to estimate all the parameters with any precision. Economic theory and the 
accounting data both strongly suggest that the returns to passive investment are not subject to 
strong management effects, so that the restriction αi = α is valid.19 The coefficient β4 on the local 
public works "sector" is already unique because only one corporation had access to these 
contracts. Finally, since the oil and local sectors are relatively homogeneous I assume that there 
are common returns to these sectors. 
 These restrictions leave firm-specific returns to the statewide sector as the reflection of 
fixed management effects and lead to the following modified version of equation (3): 
                                                 
18 An F-test strongly rejects the hypothesis of a totally pooled model (estimated by OLS) in favor of 12 separate 
OLS equations. 
19 Most of these passive investments were in relatively conservative, professionally managed portfolios. 
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ROE it =     α  + γ1 OILit  
  +Σi γ2i (Di x STATEWIDEit) 
  + γ3  LOCALit  
  + γ4  PUBWORKSit  + εit (5) 
where Di is a firm-specific dummy variable.  
 Table 5 shows the estimates of these firm-specific returns from (5). Columns 1-3 all 
report the same underlying coefficients from the basic model. The dummy variables in these 
columns are constructed in different ways to emphasize different interpretations and to yield as 
their estimated standard errors the test statistics for different hypotheses (Suits 1984). Columns 4 
and 5 provide the same robustness checks as reported above. 
 Column 1 shows the common passive return in panel A, the common differential returns 
from the oil, local, and public works sectors in panel B, and the 12 firm-specific differential 
returns from the statewide sector in panel C. This is equation (5) "as written." The standard 
errors from these coefficients allow inference about whether a particular corporation had a large 
or small differential statewide return. For example, panel C shows that the Bristol Bay 
corporation earned an estimated return of 3% below passive in the statewide sector, but this 
differential return was insignificant. 
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TABLE 5: RETURNS TO SECTORS WITH MANAGEMENT FIXED EFFECTS 




A. Absolute Return to .047* .047* .047* -.004 .054*
Passive Investment (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011)
B. Average Returns (over all firms) Relative Relative
to Active Investment in: to Passive to Passive Absolute Absolute Absolute
Oil sector -0.083 -0.083 -0.036 .059 -.093*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.050) (0.030)
Statewide sector -.599* -.552* -.425* -.282*
(Average of all 12 corporations) (0.052) (.051) (0.056) (0.033)
Local sector .306* .306* .353* .349* .051
(0.084) (0.084) (0.080) (0.098) (0.061)
Local public works 2.04* 2.04* 2.09* 1.99* 1.281*
(0.282) (0.282) (0.281) (0.298) (0.202)
C.Firm-Specific Returns to Relative Relative to
Statewide Sector Investment by: to Passive average of Peers Absolute Absolute Absolute
Ahtna -0.082 .517* -.035 0.027 -.013
(0.071) (0.070) (0.067) (0.052) (0.054)
Aleut -.281* .318* -.234* -.256* -.198*
(0.061) (0.070) (0.058) (0.120) (0.053)
Arctic Slope -2.74* -2.14* -2.69* -1.84* -1.42*
(0.463) (0.422) (0.464) (0.372) (0.300)
Bering Straits -1.36* -.759* -1.31* -1.60* -.454*
(0.249) (0.239) (0.250) (0.440) (0.066)
Bristol Bay -0.030 .569* .017 .0418 -.004
(0.038) (0.057) (0.034) (0.062) (0.015)
Calista -.386* .213* -.339* -.434* -.199*
(0.091) (0.095) (0.091) (0.131) (0.033)
Chugach -.594* 0.005 -.547* -.348 -.376*
(0.107) (0.117) (0.107) (0.207) (0.057)
Cook Inlet 0.037 .636* .084* .142* .107*
(0.032) (0.059) (0.028) (0.047) (0.031)
Doyon -.769* -.170 -.722* -.104 -.409*
(0.148) (0.150) (0.146) (0.087) (0.102)
Koniag -.700* -.101 -.653* -.489* -.479*
(0.100) (0.089) (0.102) (0.190) (0.074)
Nana -0.134 .466* -.086 -.073 .128
(0.088) (0.089) (0.086) (0.044) (0.079)
Sealaska -.154* 0.445* -.107* -.168* -.064*
(0.039) (0.062) (0.033) (0.080) (0.019)
notes: Columns 1,2,3,5 Estimated by feasible GLS with correction for heteroskedasticity & cross-sectional
correlation. Column 4 IV estimates use fitted value for fraction of assets in Statewide sector.
Std. Errors in parentheses. N=12 corporations over T=17 years.
* indicates significant at 5% level.





 The column 1 estimates show great variation across corporations in their returns from 
statewide investment, but the overall results from the simple asset allocation model of Table 4 
hold up quite well. Only Cook Inlet shows a positive differential return in the statewide sector. 
All other corporations have negative differential returns, consistent with the previous common 
estimate. In addition, the common coefficients on the oil and local sectors are relatively stable.20  
 Column 2 shows the same underlying regression formulated to show an average 
statewide return plus 12 individual statewide returns whose sum is constrained to equal zero. The 
standard errors of these deviations allow immediate inference about whether corporation i 
performed significantly better or worse than its peers. Continuing the example, column 2 of 
panel C shows that Bristol Bay earned statewide returns 56.9 percentage points higher than the 
average differential statewide return of -59.9% (shown in panel B.) 
 The Column 2 estimates emphasize the wide range of performance relative to peers. Ten 
of the 12 corporations had significantly higher or lower returns relative to the average of -59.9%, 
and these performance differentials ranged from -76 percentage points for Bering Straits to +64 
percentage points for Cook Inlet. 
 Column 3 shows the estimated absolute returns to each corporation from each sector. In 
this "bottom line" formulation the coefficient magnitudes are interesting, but the standard errors 
allow inference about whether accounting profits were positive or negative. These are less 
economically meaningful but useful for comparison with other results. 
 Finally, columns 4 and 5 use the IV estimates and the alternative measure of financial 
return (net income / assets) to check the robustness of the estimates. With a very few exceptions, 
the management fixed effects are similar under IV to their basic values in column 3. This 
suggests that in fact there was little feedback from actual returns on equity to the choice of 
projects. The column 5 estimates are scaled down as expected, and the coefficient on the LOCAL 
sector again drops dramatically, reinforcing the idea that most of the returns from this sector 
were earned early when equity was very low. 
 The results from Table 5 are summarized in Figure 4, which shows the absolute 
accounting returns to statewide investment. The average absolute return, -55%, is heavily 
influenced by the Bering Straits and Arctic Slope (not shown) values. Excluding these two, the 
                                                 
20 It is probably a statistical fluke that the returns to Arctic Slope corporation bifurcate into a very large positive 
return to local public works and a very large negative return to statewide investments. 
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average of estimated statewide returns is -28%, which is reasonably close to the value of -20% 
from the pooled model of Table 4. 
FIGURE 4: ESTIMATED STATEWIDE SECTOR ABSOLUTE RETURNS 
(ARCTIC SLOPE NOT SHOWN) 




























































 Pairwise tests of the equality between these estimated statewide sector coefficients and 
the common values for the oil and local sectors show mostly significant differences (Table 6). 
The general hypothesis of equal returns across sectors is strongly rejected. 
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TABLE 6: PAIRWISE TESTS OF EQUALITY BETWEEN SECTOR RETURNS 
(Chi-squared values from Wald tests) 
returns from: Oil Local
Oil Sector 20.0               
Statewide sector (average of all corporations): 53.6               70.4               
Statewide sector individual coefficients:
Ahtna 0.0 12.6               
Aleut 7.1                 37.5               
Arctic Slope 32.3               40.2               
Bering St 24.5               33.6               
Bristol Bay 1.0                 13.8               
Calista 8.0                 32.1               
Chugach 19.9               55.3               
Cook Inlet 6.1                 11.1               
Doyon 21.6               40.0               
Koniag 34.9               49.2               
Nana 0.2                 9.5                 
Sealaska 1.9                 28.2               
note:
Chi2 critical values are 3.84 (5%) and 6.63 (1%)
compared to return from:
 
4.2. Joint Ventures 
 While management expertise may have been initially scarce among Native leaders,21 it 
could be purchased in the market. In this section I consider the use of the joint venture 
organizational form as a way of importing scarce management skill.22 Joint venture partnerships 
potentially offer instant access to management and production expertise and to rationed 
contractual opportunities. However, they are fraught with agency problems, particularly selection 
bias. If a Native corporation has no scarce resources to bring to the partnership, then it is not 
clear why established firms with good projects would want to share the benefits with them. If the 
Natives offer nothing but naivete and capital, they will end up with nothing but bad joint 
ventures or, worse, bad wholly-owned subsidiaries (this seems to be what happened to Bering 
Straits). 
                                                 
21 see, e.g., Forker (1996), Richardson (1990), Fuerst (1988). Willie Hensley, former president of Nana 
Corporation, said: "when the act itself was passed, there was no business experience in the Native communities-
literally, from one end of the state to the other. It had been a bartering community." (Forker 1996, p. 58). 
22 Of course, management inputs could also be imported simply by hiring non-Native managers. Rigorous 
analysis of the effects of individual managers is not currently possible with the available data. 
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 In fact, the Native corporations did have some scarce resources to offer to joint ventures. 
These included their legal status as disadvantaged minorities, which earned official preferences 
in public contracts. Probably more important was their political and even moral clout. Major 
resource developers quickly realized that it was very useful to have Native corporation 
stakeholders on board when pushing politically sensitive projects and agendas. For example, 
several corporations secured maintenance contracts from the major oil companies for sections of 
the transalaska oil pipeline that ran through their lands, apparently based on political negotiations 
and promises made when Congress was considering the project. 
 Ultimately it is an empirical question whether joint ventures tended to help or hurt 
performance. To generate a crisp hypothesis I assume that all of the owners of bad projects 
managed to sell them outright to naive Natives, while those with good projects in need of 
"Native clout" formed JV partnerships. Under these assumptions JVs are a good option: 
H4: Assets allocated to joint ventures earn positive excess returns relative 
to assets in wholly owned projects in the same sector. 
The data on joint ventures 
 Standard accounting practice shows JV participation in two ways on balance sheets. 
When the Native corporation is a minority participant, its equity in the JV is typically shown as a 
specific net asset. This is the equity method of accounting and it is supposed to be reserved for 
those projects over which the corporation has little management control. When the Native 
corporation is the majority participant, the entire project is typically listed as an asset and the 
partner's equity is shown as a liability. This is the standard, or cost method. 
 To implement the test in H4 I identified assets allocated to specific joint ventures and 
coded them as fractions of total assets. I coded separate fractions for minority participation with 
non-Native partners in the oil, statewide, and local sectors. In addition I coded two allocation 
fractions that cut across sectors. The fraction JV_INT is the portion of total assets allocated to 
"internal" JVs: projects run by consortia of ANCSA corporations with no non-Native partners. 
These ventures by definition could not produce gains from non-Native expertise, and in fact may 
have offered the worst possible combination of attributes. They likely combined a common pool 
of at-risk capital, no clear responsibility for failure, no external market in tradable shares, and 
little or no external monitoring from the bond markets. The premium to internal JVs should be 
negative. 
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 The fraction JV_LIAB is the portion of total assets allocated to ventures with non-
Natives where the Native corporation is the majority partner. Altogether there are five categories 
of joint venture assets, and they are mutually exclusive. Figure 5 summarizes the data over time 
and shows that about 10% of assets were consistently allocated to joint ventures. 





































Joint venture effects: results 
 Table 7 shows the results from including joint venture asset fractions as additional 
regressors in equation (5) along with the individual corporation returns to statewide investment. 
It is useful to think of each panel of the table as showing an additional set of "treatment effects" 
applied to the assets. Panel A shows the absolute return to passive investment. Passive assets are 
the "controls." Panel B shows sector effects: the additional returns to a dollar of assets placed in 
wholly Native owned projects in the oil, statewide or local sectors. The firm-specific returns to 
statewide investment are not shown in the table; panel B simply shows the constructed average 
of the 12 coefficients. Panel C shows the further additional treatment effects of importing 
management by putting assets in joint ventures. The estimated effects are substantial and 
generally significant. In the oil sector, the additional return from being a minority share JV 
partner is 16%. In the statewide sector the premium is 36.5% and significant. The 588% JV 
premium in the local sector is an artifact of the small number of data points in this cell. 
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TABLE 7: RETURNS TO SECTORS WITH JOINT VENTURE EFFECTS 
nonwindfall rate of
return on book equity
A. (Baseline). Absolute return to passive investment: .052*
(0.013)
B. (Sector Effects). additional
Additional returns (relative to passive) return




(Constructed average of 12 corporation coefficients) (0.060)
Local sector .240*
(0.094)
Local public works 1.950*
(0.325)
C. (Organization Effects).
Additional returns (relative to 100% Native-owned) from participation in:
Oil Sector JVs with non-Native majority partners 0.160
(0.092)
Statewide sector JVs with non-Native majority partners .365*
(0.133)
Local sector JVs with non-Native majority partners 5.88*
(1.404)
All-Native ("internal") JVs in any sector -.233
(0.182)
JVs in any sector with minority non-Native partners 1.24*
(0.144)
notes: Regression estimated with 12 firm-specific coefficients on statewide sector assets.
The average reported above and its std. error are are constructed from these estimates.
Estimated by feasible GLS with correction for heteroskedasticity & cross-sectional
correlation. Std. Errors in parentheses. N=12 corporations over T=17 years.
* indicates significant at 5% level.
Investment sector
 
 Although not significant, the return premium to wholly Native JVs is -23%, consistent 
with a pool of assets being appropriated rather than invested. (Much of the internal JV data is 
generated by an "all-Native" bank that failed). Finally, the premium to majority-owned JVs is 
124% and significant. Further inspection of the data shows that this coefficient essentially 
reflects the successful oil drilling business of the Doyon corporation. 
 Including JV effects does not noticeably change the common sector returns in panel B or 
the firm-specific returns (not displayed), with the notable exception of the oil sector. There, the 
return had been unstable and close to zero in previous specifications such as shown in Table 4. 
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With JV assets separated out, the oil coefficient resolves itself into three quite different returns. 
The estimated return to 100% Native-owned projects is -44% (panel B), while at the opposite 
extreme the return to majority-owned JVs is +124% and dominated by the single Doyon Drilling 
enterprise. In the middle are minority-share JVs, where the JV premium of +16% only offsets a 
part of the estimated average losses. 
Summary of management and joint venture tests 
 In this section I augmented the simple asset allocation model to accommodate firm-
specific returns and the effects of joint ventures. Hypothesis H3, couched in deliberately strong 
form, said that sectoral differences are not important and only management matters. The results 
do not support this hypothesis. Both management within a sector and sectoral choice are 
important to performance. The differences between sectors in the simple model are not just a 
proxy for differences in management. They persist when individual returns are introduced. But 
within the statewide sector the estimated returns (mostly losses) do vary tremendously across 
corporations - from +8% to -131%23 The "within-sector" variation in statewide sector returns 
among corporations exceeds the "between-sector" variation, but the magnitude of the ranges is 
roughly the same. 
 The estimated return premia earned through joint ventures with non-Native partners are 
consistently positive, while the premium on internal consortia is negative. These results support 
hypothesis H4, which predicts that joint ventures with external partners will be good for Natives.  
5. Tradeoffs Between Profits and Wages 
 In this section I broaden the focus to include shareholder employment as a measure of 
economic success. Persistent unemployment was perceived as the most important economic 
problem by several ANCSA corporations. If the social opportunity cost of shareholder labor is 
significantly below market wages, or if there are significant benefits from human capital 
accumulation or just being able to work with Native peers, then it could be efficient for managers 
to provide jobs at the expense of profits. Table 3 at the start of this paper shows the tremendous 
variation in shareholder employment for the year 1991. 
                                                 
23 excluding Arctic Slope, whose estimated statewide return of -269% is juxtaposed against an estimated return 
to local public works of +209%. 
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 The analysis of financial returns presented above shows that most corporations made 
significant financial losses in statewide sector enterprises. The evidence on the oil sector is 
mixed, and the local sector seems to have provided positive but limited profits. Since 
participation in the money-losing statewide sector was optional, an efficient asset allocation can 
only be inferred if there is a marked tradeoff between profits and the quasirents from 
employment. 
 Employment quasirents are not the same thing as wages. To count as quasirent, a given 
wage must exceed the social opportunity cost of the particular shareholder who holds the job. If 
Native corporation jobs simply attract otherwise employable shareholders and pay roughly 
market wages, then they are not providing net benefits via employment. 
 I formulate these notions into the following general null hypothesis: 
H5: Native corporations traded off financial profits for payroll quasirents 
along an efficient frontier within and across economic sectors. Different 
outcomes across corporations reflect different preferences and trace out a 
single technical production possibilities frontier. 
Of course H5 is impossible to prove in the affirmative, but it is potentially falsifiable. I now use 
the asset allocation model to consider the tradeoffs between profits and employment quasirents. 
5.1. Generation of Payroll and Quasirent Estimates 
 There are no consistent data on Native shareholder employment or payroll. I generated 
estimates of shareholder payroll for each corporation and year from my own mail surveys, 
several special studies, and a careful reading of the corporation annual reports and the Alaska 
business trade press. The coding process is discussed in the Data Appendix to this paper. 
 To convert payroll to quasirents I use the relative shortfall between 1990 Native per 
capita personal income in each region and the overall (all races) 1990 per capita personal income 
in Anchorage. Anchorage has a well-developed labor market and the highest per capita income 
in the state. 
 
 QUASIRENTSit = PAYROLLit x (1 - (Native per capita Incomei / Anchorage Income)) 
 
For example, if Alaska Native per capita income in region i is equal to Anchorage per capita 
income, then there is zero quasirent component within the payroll. If Native per capita income is 
60% of Anchorage income, then quasirents equal 40% of payroll. Note that the shortfall going 
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into this formula takes into account both regional poverty and the Native-white income 
differential. 
 Table 8 summarizes the data on shareholder payroll and presents my estimates of 
quasirents from payroll. It confirms that Arctic Slope and Nana were indeed very successful at 
generating wages for shareholders. The Ahtna corporation was also a standout, based on its small 
shareholder base and its early entry into the construction and security businesses. The Anchorage 
1990 per capita income used as the benchmark for estimating quasirents is $22,940, so the 
average estimated quasirent fraction of payroll is about 50%. It is significantly higher in many of 
the more remote areas., including the Ahtna and Nana regions. 
TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF SHAREHOLDER PAYROLL AND ESTIMATED QUASIRENTS 
Average Average Average
Average Annual Shareholder per capita Annual
Annual Shareholder Payroll Native Payroll
Shareholder Payroll return on Income in Quasirents
Corporation Payroll per  Shareholder equity 1990 per  Shareholder
$000 $ % $ $
Ahtna 1,600 1,455 15.5% 9,388 859
Aleut 353 109 3.1% 14,179 42
Arctic Slope 9,450 2,528 32.1% 12,120 1,192
Bering Straits 266 43 5.7% 6,373 31
Bristol Bay 177 34 0.6% 9,273 20
Calista 994 75 4.6% 5,589 56
Chugach Natives 869 412 4.0% 15,637 131
Cook Inlet 1,410 215 1.2% 10,682 115
Doyon 1,924 212 3.2% 7,605 142
Koniag 245 66 3.8% 12,237 31
NANA 8,115 1,623 20.3% 7,236 1,111
Sealaska 5,251 334 5.2% 11,723 164
Unweighted Average 2,555 592 8.3% 10,170 325  
 
5.2. Quasirents in the Asset Allocation Model 
 The estimates of "payroll return on equity" and "quasirent return on equity" can be used 
as alternative measures of economic return in the asset allocation model. These variables are 
clearly endogenous. Because of the causal link between actual payroll and the amount of assets 
allocated to the statewide sector, I keep the measures of returns from payroll on the left side of 
the regression and use the fitted value STATEHAT as an instrument for the fraction of assets in 
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the statewide sector. As an initial test for the presence of an efficient wage-profit tradeoff, I 
simply regress different measures of the "return on equity" on the asset shares. I consider wages 
(payroll), quasirents, and combinations of profits and payroll. Table 9 reports the results.  
TABLE 9: WAGES AND QUASIRENTS IN THE ASSET ALLOCATION MODEL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Profits Profits plus
Profits Wages Quasirents plus Wages Quasirents
A. Absolute Return to
       Passive Investment: .043* .021* .003* .058* .033*
(0.016) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.014) (0.017)
B. Absolute Returns to
       Active Investment in:
Oil sector .130* .288* .164* .434* .354*
(OIL) (0.038) (0.010) (0.006) (0.049) (0.049)
Statewide sector -.128* -.005* .003* -.142* -.137*
(STATEHAT) (0.030) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027) (0.032)
Local sector .089 .025* .007* .443* .404*
(LOCAL) .100 (0.001) (0.001) (0.098) (0.097)
Local public works .629* .758* .332* 1.35* .900*
(PUBWORKS) (0.158) (0.050) (0.027) (0.149) (0.157)
notes: Estimated by feasible GLS, using
fitted values for the fraction of assets in the statewide sector.
Std. Errors in parentheses. N=12 corporations over T=17 years.
* indicates significant at 5% level.




 There appear to be clear and large payroll payoffs to investment in the oil, local, and local 
public works sectors. Surprisingly, however, the estimated wages return on equity in the 
statewide sector is minus 0.5% and significant. The quasirent statewide sector return (column 3) 
is barely positive, and in any case completely insufficient to offset the negative profits from this 
sector, as shown in columns 4 and 5. Overall, these simple estimates cast immediate doubt on the 
hypothesis of an efficient wage-profits tradeoff. 
 Table 10 adds firm fixed effects to the specification. Column 1 repeats the previous IV 
estimates of profit return on equity from section 3 above. Columns 2 and 3 show that with firm 
fixed effects, the average statewide sector wage and quasirent returns on equity are positive and 
significant. However, they are still far too small to keep the combined returns from profits and 
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payroll from being strongly negative. The oil sector combined return from profits and quasirents 
jumps to about 14% and the local sector appears to provide very large combined returns. 
 Inspection of the firm-specific returns to statewide investment confirms that Ahtna, 
Arctic Slope, and Nana earned large positive quasirent returns. For these three firms, the change 
in economic performance when estimated quasirents are counted is dramatic.24 The tiny Ahtna 
corporation has the highest combined return on statewide investment, and Nana moves from -7% 
to +10%. Figure 6 summarizes these changes to firms' individual returns. The major message of 
these results is that with the exceptions just noted, most corporations generated little or zero 
quasirent offset to their negative profits from statewide investment. For these firms, the evidence 
strongly rejects the hypothesis (H5) of an efficient wage-profit tradeoff. 
FIGURE 6: ESTIMATED STATEWIDE SECTOR ABSOLUTE RETURNS 
WITH AND WITHOUT PAYROLL QUASIRENTS INCLUDED AS "PROFIT" 
Estimated Returns from Statewide Investment:































































                                                 
24 As noted above, Arctic Slope's very negative statewide return is probably a statistical fluke mirroring their 
similarly large positive coefficient on the local public works sector. The important thing to note here is the positive 
change in return from including labor income in their statewide sector return. 
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TABLE 10: PAYROLL RETURNS WITH FIXED MANAGEMENT EFFECTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Profits Profits plus
Profits Wages Quasirents plus Wages Quasirents
A. Absolute Return to -.004 .013* .004* .059* .038*
Passive Investment (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.016) (0.018)
B. Average Absolute Returns (over all firms)
to Active Investment in:
Oil sector .059 .099* .058* .200* .141*
(0.050) (0.006) (0.003) (0.065) (0.061)
Statewide sector -.425* .134* .068* -.372* -.421*
(Average of all 12 corporations) (0.056) (0.012) (0.006) (0.061) (0.059)
Local sector .349* .016* .006* .583* .566*
(0.098) (0.002) (0.001) (0.114) (0.107)
Local public works 1.99* .267* .131* 2.31* 2.15*
(0.298) (0.074) (0.034) (0.258) (0.277)
C.Firm-Specific Absolute Returns to
Statewide Sector Investment by:
Ahtna 0.027 .293* .176* .248* .143*
(0.052) (0.034) (0.020) (0.063) (0.055)
Aleut -.256* -.006 -.001 -.330* -.314*
(0.120) (0.005) (0.002) (0.119) (0.120)
Arctic Slope -1.84* .746* .337* -.131* -1.634*
(0.372) (0.093) (0.044) (0.354) (0.365)
Bering Straits -1.60* -.011* -.003 -.152* -1.54*
(0.440) (0.001) (0.001) (0.432) (0.438)
Bristol Bay .042 -.019* -0.007* -.032 -.010
(0.062) (0.003) (0.001) (0.061) (0.061)
Calista -.434* .028* .025* -.412* -.423*
(0.131) (0.007) (0.005) (0.128) (0.128)
Chugach -.348 .201* .031 -.246 -.391
(0.207) (0.096) (0.034) (0.242) (0.219)
Cook Inlet .142* -.011* -.004* .065 .085
(0.047) (0.003) (0.002) (0.053) (0.052)
Doyon -.104 -.005 .005 -.215* -.179*
(0.087) (0.005) (0.003) (0.091) (0.091)
Koniag -.489* -.020* -.007* -.721* -.674*
(0.190) (0.002) (0.001) (0.186) (0.189)
Nana -.073 .295* .208* .176* .095
(0.044) (0.035) (0.024) (0.061) (0.053)
Sealaska -.168* .114* .067* -.175* -.203*
(0.080) (0.017) (0.009) (0.071) (0.075)
notes: Estimated by FGLS with correction for heteroskedasticity & cross-sectional correlation.
All regressions use fitted values for fraction of assets in Statewide sector.
Std. Errors in parentheses. N=12 corporations over T=17 years.
* indicates significant at 5% level.
Investment sector
dependent variable = asbsolute returns on equity in the form of:
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5.3. Using Grouped Data to Test for Efficient Wage-Profit Tradeoffs 
 Although it is not possible to directly identify the "tradeoff coefficient" in a regression of 
profits on quasirents, it is possible to use grouped data to generate an alternative test of the 
efficient tradeoff hypothesis. In a simple regression of the form 
 PROFITSit =  α  + β  x QUASIRENTSit , 
the coefficient on quasirents is unidentified because the desired wages-profits combination is an 
endogenous outcome of maximization over preferences subject to the constraints provided by the 
menu of available projects. The observed profit-wage combination is also a function of luck. 
Figure 7 helps clarify this point. Suppose corporation A prefers profits and has an optimal 
expansion path OA, while corporation B prefers wages and tries to expand along OB. Relative to 
point a1, corporation B is better off at b2 while corporation A is worse off. If we observe a 
collection of points like a1 and b2, we cannot tell whether profits are being efficiently traded off 
for wages across firms. If, however, we observe points b1 and b2 and each of those points is an 
estimate of a different firm's average returns, with shocks removed, then it would be possible to 
conclude that some firms are simply more productive than others. 










 Using grouped data provides a way to carry out this test. Assuming each firm has fixed 
preferences, then the combination of the average profit rate of return and the average quasirent 
rate of return for firm i provides an estimate of firm i's position on its own technical frontier. 
Each pair of estimated returns for firm i is for a given set of preferences and averages out the 
lucky and unlucky realized returns. In order to be tracing out an efficient production possibilities 
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frontier that trades off profits for wages across firms, the points must have a generally negative 
correlation. If the some points lie strictly below and to the left of others, then some firms are 
inefficient relative to their peers. They have lower profits and lower quasirents. 
 Figure 8 shows the set of combinations of profit return on equity and quasirent return on 
equity for the 12 corporations' statewide sector operations. The returns are estimates from 
separate equations such as those in column 1 and column 3 of Table 10. The scatterplot has a 
generally positive slope. The simple correlation coefficient between profits and quasirents is 
0.28. In particular, Ahtna and Nana show very high rates of quasirent return on equity without 
making great sacrifices of profits. 
FIGURE 8: AVERAGE PROFIT-QUASIRENT COMBINATIONS (ACROSS FIRMS) FROM 
 STATEWIDE SECTOR INVESTMENT 
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Summary of Evidence on Profit-Wage Tradeoffs 
 Several regional corporations generated large amounts of payroll paid to their 
shareholders. The returns on equity in the form of payroll or quasirents are high in the oil and 
local sectors and in the statewide sector for certain firms. Ahtna, Nana, and Arctic Slope have 
significantly higher rates of return from statewide investment when quasirents are added to 
profits. Overall, however, the evidence is not consistent with an efficient tradeoff of profits for 
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wages. Most corporations made huge losses in the statewide sector even when the entire 
shareholder payroll is counted as part of the return on equity. Furthermore, grouped data show a 
generally positive correlation between average realized profits and average realized quasirents 
across firms. This test rejects the hypothesis (H5) of a single efficient profit-payroll frontier. As 
a rule, the firms that lost the most money provided the fewest jobs. 
6. Persistent Fixed Effects, Internal Incentives, and Preferences 
 The results presented above show that persistent firm-specific factors explain a 
significant proportion of the variation in performance after controlling for natural resource 
endowments, asset allocations, employment benefits, and the use of joint ventures as a direct 
substitute for internal management skill.25 These fixed effects could be the expression of deeper 
causes that are hard to quantify or to embed in an individual optimizing framework (Cockburn & 
Henderson 1996). Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the historical record gives the strong 
impression that some Native corporations ran smoothly in spite of external shocks while others 
seemed to be caught in a perpetual quagmire of bad projects, management turnover, litigation, 
and internal discord.  
 In this section I briefly consider the roles of individual incentives and heterogeneous 
preferences as possible sources of these fixed effects. This approach to variable performance 
moves the focus from outside to inside the firm, toward the amorphous concepts of shared 
norms, culture as a public good, and concepts of "social capability" and culture.26 I provide some 
evidence in support of the importance of internal factors and draw connections between the 
exogenous attributes of some Native groups, the internal political economy of their corporations, 
and the resulting economic performance. Unfortunately the small sample size and lack of data 
make it hard to test these propositions beyond confronting them with case histories. 
6.1. Agency Problems and Preference Aggregation Problems Within 
ANCSA Corporations 
 It has long been recognized that the structure of property rights within the firm and the 
incentives they generate can greatly affect the actual achievable output  (Shapley and Shubik 
                                                 
25 In OLS versions of the asset allocation regressions presented in sections 4 and 5 above, the adjusted R2 rises 
from .13 to .37 when firm-specific returns from the statewide sector are introduced. 
26 Abramovitz (1986) borrows the term "social capability" from Ohkawa (1973). 
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1967, Jensen and Meckling 1979). On the outside, a Native corporation may appear to be a 
unified business firm. But on the inside, the structure of inalienable and permanently diffuse 
control rights makes the organization more like an American Indian tribe or very small country. 
To be successful, such groups must confront and solve two related internal problems. There is an 
agency problem and a preference aggregation problem. 
Agency problems in Native corporations 
 Like other firms, ANCSA corporations face standard governance problems stemming 
from the separation of ownership and control. These agency problems are exacerbated by the fact 
that stock cannot be traded and by the lack of good monitoring skills among the all-Native 
boards of directors. The shareholders' inability to use "exit" as a discipline mechanism 
(Hirschmann 1972) clearly gives management, employees, and outside parasites more leeway to 
pursue their rent-seeking objectives, including shirking, empire-building, or nepotism. (Karpoff 
and Rice 1989, Milgrom and Roberts 1988, Buchanan, Tollison &Tullock 1967). 
 The huge financial losses of many Native corporations show that these problems were 
real and important. Given the ease with which dissipation could occur, the interesting question is 
why some corporations managed to avoid financial disaster. Since the law imposed the same 
formal corporate structure on all 12 Native groups, it is not possible to explain relative success 
stories without considering the match between this formal structure and the pre-existing 
collection of norms, rules, and beliefs that each group brought to their new corporation (Cornell 
and Kalt 1995). This shifts the focus of inquiry to the preference aggregation problem. 
The preference aggregation problem 
 Even if all agents act as perfect instruments of the principals' wishes, there remains the 
problem of multiple principals with multiple objectives and conflicting preferences. Should the 
corporation maximize current dividends, future dividends, or jobs? In neoclassical competitive 
theory, this problem is solved by a version of the Fisher separation theorem, which guarantees 
that shareholders can divorce their optimal consumption plans from any one firm's production 
plans. These shareholders can unanimously support the maximization of market value as the 
firm's sole objective (Milne 1974). But with no trading in shares and a fixed communal land base 
as their chief asset, the Alaska Natives could not separate wealth maximization from optimal 
consumption. 
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 With fixed, diffuse stock ownership, the shareholder preference aggregation problem 
closely resembles that of a small country choosing among economic plans. Under these 
circumstances, Boylan, Ledyard and McKelvey (1996) recently demonstrated that even if 
complete commitment to a multiperiod economic plan is possible, a majority-rule equilibrium 
will not exist. Under different commitment assumptions, political business cycles are also 
possible, as are median-voter outcomes. In short, anything can happen when consumption and 
investment plans are politically determined as a joint bundle. This indeterminacy echoes Bates' 
(1990) assertion that the aggregation of preferences by means other than markets is the central -- 
and least understood -- feature of developing societies.  
 An Alaska Native corporation will have serious problems choosing strategies and 
projects when shareholder preferences are highly heterogeneous. One problem is timing. Many 
Natives were illiquid and, ceteris paribus, would seem to favor dividend distributions over 
reinvestment, even to the point of partial liquidation of the firm. A second problem is that the 
returns from some projects accrued as high wages to a few lucky shareholder-workers rather than 
as dividends. The gains might also accrue solely to top managers as inflated salaries, human 
capital, prestige, or power. In this environment, a board of directors faced with strong tradeoffs 
between shareholder wages, human capital, and cash returns must choose whether to maximize 
measured accounting profits by sending resources outside the region to earn safe but low returns 
or whether to maximize long-run "Native GDP" by investing locally. 
 The internal political economy of the group is a source of potentially serious constraints 
on these choices and, hence, on ex post profitability. Specifically, if the group has social 
mechanisms in place to redistribute income and wealth across time and individuals, then a 
socially productive investment can be chosen without regard for the distribution of the benefits. 
If, on the other hand, the group consists of narrowly selfish individuals, many projects may not 
be politically feasible and the strictly egalitarian alternative of external investment must be used 
to achieve a constrained maximum. 
 In strong form, the basic premise underlying the internal incentives approach to 
differential performance is that beneficial projects do exist. These projects could come from all 
quarters -- the sector doesn't matter. The successful corporations somehow align their 
preferences and internal incentives to solve two problems. First, they check outright dissipation 
from opportunism and ineptitude. Second, they manage to efficiently take the returns from these 
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projects in one of three forms: accounting profits, payroll quasirents, or additions to human 
capital. The unsuccessful corporations dissipate the returns outright or simply avoid projects 
because they can't internalize the social benefits of jobs and human capital formation. 
 I now consider two potentially observable means by which these internal problems might 
be overcome. The first is the use of external investment and debt finance as a discipline device to 
check rent seeking. The second is a fortuitous pre-existing tendency toward cooperation, which 
may be fostered by group size, geographic proximity, or more inscrutable aspects of the group's 
traditional culture. 
6.2.  Using External Investment and Debt to Check Rent Seeking 
 Tornell and Velasco (1993, TV) provide a formal model where capital flight from 
countries is rational because external returns are secure while internal investments are subject to 
appropriation, driving the private return below the social. In what TV call an internal 
equilibrium, the private (post-appropriation) return to internal investment is equated by a no-
arbitrage condition to the safe but low external return. What TV call extreme equilibria are also 
possible. In these cases the appropriation rates can be arbitrarily high or arbitrarily low. The 
model admits both a pure Hobbesian struggle and a utopian cooperative solution arbitrarily close 
to the first best. 
 The main insight of the TV model in this context is that the option of external investment 
provides a source of discipline which can help check internal appropriation. First, the Native 
corporation board (acting as subprincipal) can restrain management from empire building and 
nepotism by periodically removing resources from their control. (As always, the credible threat 
need not be carried out to be effective in equilibrium.) Second, the board (as agent) can bond 
itself to the shareholder body by establishing restricted passive investment funds.  
 External investment takes current cash holdings out of agents' hands. In a dynamic 
analogue of this concept, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that debt finance serves the same 
purpose by taking future cash flows out of management's hands. The use of debt also induces 
external monitoring by bondholders. The theory of external investment as discipline suggests the 
following proposition: 
H6(a): Corporations that have successful active business operations will 
also have some funds invested passively and some outstanding debt, while 
the biggest failures at active business will have all their assets committed 
to it with little associated debt. 
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Unfortunately this is a very weak test, since there are other good reasons for passive external 
investment and issuing debt. The establishment of permanent shareholder trust funds restricted to 
passive investment is a stronger sign that the board or the shareholder body is trying to control 
internal dissipation. A weak test for this is:  
H6(b): The establishment of restricted passive investment funds is highly 
correlated with recent business losses and the receipt of windfall cash 
flows. 
6.3. Externalities, Social Accounting and Social Capability 
 Tornell and Velasco demonstrate extreme equilibria featuring either a Hobbesian free-
for-all or near perfect cooperation. These demonstrations provide formal backing for the elusive 
concept of social capability (Okhawa, 1973). As Abramovitz (1986) argues, "Tenacious societal 
characteristics normally account for a portion, perhaps a substantial portion, of a country's past 
failure to achieve as high a level of productivity as economically more advanced countries."(p. 
387).  
 One measure of social capability is the ability of the group to aggregate preferences by 
internalizing positive externalities. For Alaska Natives, two possible externalities from active 
business ventures are private human capital accumulation and high wages.27 The evidence 
presented in section 5 above shows that payroll quasirents were indeed very important to several 
corporations. If the human capital acquired by managers and employees remains with the 
corporation, measured profits may eventually go up. If it stays with a Native shareholder that 
goes elsewhere, it nonetheless benefits total Native income. But other shareholders may revolt if 
a few get all the benefits in the form of new skills and high wages. Because of long gestation 
times, effective human capital formation could require a significant intergenerational transfer 
from the old to the young. In the same way, high wages paid to shareholder-workers with low 
opportunity costs are transfer payments that contribute to total Native income but do not show up 
as measured corporate profits. 
 The President of the Nana corporation summed up these dilemmas in a statewide 1977 
speech: 
                                                 
27 Agglomeration economies from increased local economic activity have also been mentioned by Native 
leaders. 
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Getting jobs for your Native stockholders is a costly proposition. You give 
up profits for this type of objective. I'm not saying that's wrong. We're 
doing it. Not making much of a profit but we're doing it. But is this what 
we want our regional corporations to do? 28 
 A willingness to accept income to others as income to the group is one possible attribute 
of social capability. Driving this willingness could be actual or perceived sharing mechanisms 
such as the kin-based networks historically used by many Alaska Natives to buffer uncertainty in 
subsistence harvests. Another source of this internalizing capability could simply be small group 
size or proximity to one another. 
 Whatever the deep sources, I hypothesize that smaller or more historically cohesive 
Native groups are better able to choose the cooperative equilibrium in an appropriation game. 
Due to the proximity and repeated interactions of their members, they have more social capital 
per capita, such as internal sharing and disciplining networks, and they can monitor and control 
internal rent seeking at lower cost. As a result, they can take advantage of projects with high 
social returns that may be unequally distributed, outside the accounting boundaries of the 
company's books, or susceptible to outright appropriation. This general proposition can be 
narrowed into a series of weak tests: 
H7: Ceteris paribus, smaller corporations will be more profitable. 
Controlling for size, village corporations will be more successful at active 
business than regional corporations, due to their physical coherence. 
Regions with continued high reliance on traditional subsistence activities 
will have higher employment at the expense of profits. 
6.4.  Evidence on Internal Incentives, Employment, and Success 
Evidence on external investment and debt as a discipline device (H10) 
 Table 11 reports the results of several simple cross-section regressions using the 
estimated active business ROE in the statewide sector from Table 5 above.29  Proposition H6(a) 
says that the best performers have significant debt and passive assets in their portfolios. The 
regression of ROE on the share of debt in total assets does not support this directly; the estimated 
coefficient of return on debt fraction is -1.12, which has the wrong sign. Evidently the worst 
                                                 
28 John Shaeffer, President, Nana Corporation, speech to Alaska Federation of Natives Convention, November 
11, 1977. Mimeo, available from the author. 
29 I assigned a return of zero to Arctic Slope, which had the unlikely combination of -270% (statewide ) and 
+209% (local public works). 
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performers also carried high debt loads. The second result in panel A is weakly consistent with 
H6(a). Corporations that held back a higher share of their assets in passive investment during the 
early decade 1977-86 had slightly higher returns. This estimate is not significant, however. In 
panel B there is modest support for H6(b), which said that high losses would lead the board or 
shareholders to check dissipation by formally setting aside resources in restricted passive 
investment funds. The regression in panel B uses the change in the passive share of total assets as 
the dependent variable and the estimated coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that 
the worst performers between 1977 and 1986 did have the largest subsequent jumps in their 
passive asset shares. 
 Anecdotal evidence also supports the proposition that alert shareholders acted to take 
resources out of management's hands, especially when large sums of cash from tax loss sales 
became noticeable on the corporate books (Bauman 1991, Associated Press 1994a). It is also 
instructive to note that although it ended up with debt finance for its hotel, the Calista 
corporation initially sank all of its own equity into the project with very little external debt. Only 
when cost overruns began accruing did they seek major external finance. At that point they 
required a government loan guarantee from the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs in order to 
complete the project. 






sector ROE and (1987-92)
A. ROE as a function of:
share of debt in total assets -1.124
(0.600)
Early (1977-86) share of 0.125
passive assets in total assets (0.951)
B. Change in passive share of total
 assets between (1977-86) and (1987-92)
Statewide sector ROE -0.437
(0.138)





Evidence on size and success 
 Hypothesis H7 states that smaller corporations (measured in terms of shareholders) and 
village corporations would have better performance due to the lower costs of monitoring agents 
and aggregating preferences. A simple regression testing this claim is: 
 ROE = -.083 - .00000174 (SIZE)  +  .061 (VILLAGE) 
   (.00000861)  (.066) 
 
where SIZE is the number of shareholders in a mixed sample of regional and village corporations 
and VILLAGE is a dummy variable for village corporations. Although extremely imprecise, these 
estimates support the proposition that size and geographic dispersion across a region do hinder 
performance. The magnitude of the SIZE effect is trivial, but the village corporation effect is a 
substantial 6-percentage point increase in ROE. 
Evidence on social capability 
 The most financially successful corporation, Cook Inlet, took a hands-off approach to 
broader social goals. They focused solely on profits and took advantage of their location in the 
"big city" of Anchorage to pursue active business without regard for jobs. President Roy 
Huhndorf once said, "we hire shareholders, but we don't overburden ourselves. If we fail in 
business we are worthless."30 One reason they succeeded may have been that their shareholder 
base was already well assimilated into the market economy and knew what to expect and look 
for from their ANCSA corporation. In particular, Cook Inlet appears to have had an effective 
board that was able to monitor both Native management and a large number of non-Native 
technocrats that were hired in to run specific operations.  
 In contrast to Cook Inlet and its embrace of financial profits, the evidence in section 5 
above confirms that both Nana and Arctic Slope provided large numbers of jobs to their 
shareholders even though located in very remote areas. A third corporation (Ahtna) achieved the 
highest overall return from active statewide investments when payroll quasirents are added to 
profits. But the rest of the group was largely unable to balance business losses with shareholder 
payroll. 
                                                 
30 Roy Huhndorf, President, Cook Inlet Incorporated, quoted in Strohmeyer (1993, p. 185) 
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 The distinguishing feature of the successful employment-oriented groups is their relative 
isolation from the white majority society and their internal political and social cohesion. The 
same political elite that emerged as the Arctic Slope management demonstrated its prowess early 
on by organizing a new borough (county) on the North Slope in order to usurp for themselves the 
property taxing power over the Prudhoe Bay oil field. They took the tax money and funneled it 
sideways to their regional corporation, mostly in the form of high-paying construction contracts. 
Because their traditional (and still intact) subsistence economy was based on offshore whaling, it 
required a strictly hierarchical division of labor coupled with widespread kin-based sharing of 
the catch. When the Arctic Slope Corporation was formed, all of the senior management were 
whaling captains and one leader called the corporation "the new harpoon."31 
 Nana's approach to its role as a Native corporation is equally striking. In 1976 Nana's 
president John Shaeffer told an interviewer that the mission of the corporation was to "provide 
people with an opportunity to participate in western culture at whatever pace and degree they 
feel is possible for them."32 In other words, Nana saw itself as a bridge to western society which 
no one had to cross if they did not wish to. 
 From this basic self-conception followed a number of operating practices that appear to 
be unique among all regional corporations. These include the early and consistent separation of 
ceremonial leadership from day to day operations, a continuing emphasis on pride in culture, and 
an almost fanatical pursuit of employment on terms compatible with traditional Eskimo 
subsistence. Nana was the first (and Ahtna the only other) regional corporation to merge with its 
villages, and when the question arose in 1991 of whether to issue new stock to the young Natives 
not originally included in ANCSA, the Nana shareholders quickly changed their bylaws to grant 
new shares to all descendants of original shareholders, forever. Only two other corporations have 
voted to grant any inclusion to succeeding generations, and one of these was Arctic Slope 
(Associated Press 1994b). 
 Ironically, further evidence of the importance to Nana's success of a tightly integrated 
shareholder group comes from recent changes to that group. Recently, Nana has started offering 
its shareholder-employees that work at the zinc mine free transportation between the mine and 
                                                 
31 Edwardsen 1974. 
32 John Shaeffer, personal interview with Victor Fischer, 1975. Recorded as part of Fischer's "ANCSA Regional 
Corporations Study." Notes on file at: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Anchorage AK. 
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Anchorage. According to a senior Nana executive, many young workers have left their villages 
and moved to the city, and they do not share cash wages in the same way that they share housing 
and food within the village. The resulting stress on social networks has led to increased calls 
(from non-employees) for dividends instead of jobs and special benefits for elders.33 The mine, 
in fact, has been run at a loss since startup but provides almost 200 jobs. 
Evidence on social discord 
 The Bering Straits debacle stands in stark contrast to the Nana outcome. The Bering 
Straits regional leadership co-mingled the village and regional assets without informing the 
villages, then tried to merge when the ploy was discovered. The merger attempt backfired and 
degenerated into a series of legal battles between Bering Straits and its own village corporations, 
all of whom shared the same putative owners. After one of several management shakeups, the 
1981 annual report revealed that there had been 108 separate lawsuits pending against the 
company in January 1978 --only two years after business operations started up in earnest. 
 As early as 1978, a new non-Native vice president was planning a full retreat from the 
initial money-losing business ventures that had already brought the company to the brink of 
bankruptcy. But this passive investment strategy was not good enough for the regional political 
leadership. The outside manager was soon forced to resign as part of a plan to return the 
company to all-Native management and to embark on speculative oil investments in the Bering 
Sea.34  
 Eventually the regional corporation went formally bankrupt but its chief creditors were its 
own village corporations, and as a result, the regional corporation signed over much of its 
subsurface land rights to the villages that already owned the surface35.  
 Bering Straits was not the only group to exhaust itself through internecine legal warfare. 
The Koniag corporation experienced similar problems when it attempted a merger with its 
villages. After the merger was initially complete, one village sued to overturn it, claiming that 
Koniag was expropriating its timber resources, which was technically true. The courts ordered a 
"demerger" that returned half of the village corporations to independent status. While this 
                                                 
33 Sarah Scanlan, Nana director of human resources, personal interview, January 3 1996. 
34 Bering Straits Corporation Annual Reports, 1978-81. 
35 Alaska Superior Court, Case 3AN-80-6815 (Civ). 
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wrangling went on the entire ANCSA cash settlement was lost in failed business ventures. The 
saga -- but not the losses --  ended when the entire board and management were overthrown. 
 Both Bering Straits and Koniag had active subsistence activities going on in their regions 
when ANCSA was passed, but neither region was economically or socially connected through 
kin-based sharing networks. The Koniag people had interacted extensively with the Russian 
colonists and many had adopted the Russian Orthodox faith. Their subsistence activities were 
oriented outward, to the sea. And in the Bering Straits region, one detailed field report suggests 
that the area was balkanized into strictly defined hunting areas defended by individual tribes, 
sometimes in shifting alliances with one another (Ray 1967). 
 
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper I have considered the large variation in economic performance among 12 
Alaska Native corporations that were established by fiat in 1971 and charged with improving the 
lives of a poor indigenous people living in a remote, harsh region. The average performance of 
the group was poor, but several relative success stories stand out against the backdrop of several 
hundred million dollars in business losses. 
 Asset allocation to different sectors was a significant determinant of overall returns 
(measured net of windfalls). Surprisingly, the only positive profit returns to active investment 
were in local enterprises, where the small size of the market limited the scope of activity in a 
way that was probably observable to all. The Native corporations’ losses were spread among 
many statewide enterprises outside the oil industry, such as fishing, construction, real estate, and 
hotels. In the statewide sector, the estimated average annual return on equity is -20% in a pooled 
regression and ranges between -130% and + 8% when individual corporation returns are allowed 
to vary. Contrary to popular belief, the estimated average return in the oil sector was zero -- or 
negative if the project had no joint venture partner. 
 The use of the joint venture offered a mechanism for importing scarce management and 
production expertise and securing rationed contracts with the oil industry. Joint ventures with 
established non-Native firms lost slightly less money than wholly owned operations, while the 
few wholly Native joint ventures returned a significant negative premium. 
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 The evidence strongly rejects the hypothesis of an efficient wage-profit tradeoff across 
firms. Shareholder employment provided significant benefits to only three corporations. For 
these three, however, the economic returns in the form of payroll quasirents were quite large. 
When profits are augmented by quasirents, the top two employment generators had the highest 
economic returns from active statewide investment. The two most successful job creators, Nana 
and Arctic Slope, appear to have high levels of social cohesion, political capacity, and 
subsistence-based sharing. These mechanisms, however, may be under stress as economic and 
social integration with non-Native society proceeds. 
 The pattern of profits and losses provides mixed support for the concept of economic 
dualism in a remote resource-dependent region such as Alaska. Modern sector enterprises 
connected to the existing oil industry provided jobs and sometimes profits, but were limited to a 
fixed pool of opportunities. In some cases the Natives managed to tap existing contractual 
opportunities with joint venture partners, but the evidence on wholly-owned investments 
suggests that attempts to create new opportunities on their own generally failed.  
 Both the persistence of business losses through time and the wide range of firm-specific 
returns to statewide investment suggest that in some cases profitability was simply ignored or 
submerged in a sea of ineptitude and dissipation. Because shareholders could not sell their shares 
and had poorly developed monitoring skills, a large amount of rent seeking undoubtedly 
occurred. In the Bering Straits case in particular, the data suggest that the Natives simply paid 
inflated prices for nonperforming business entities. They suffered huge capital losses to outside 
opportunists even before operations began. 
 There are no easy answers to the question of what made some Alaska Native corporations 
respectable performers while most lost millions in repeated business failures. Capital was not the 
scarce factor limiting the Natives' economic advancement. Instead, they were stymied by rapidly 
diminishing returns to that capital. Some corporations dealt with this problem adroitly, but for 
lack of good management most did not. Firm-specific fixed effects are statistically important but 
have few easily observable causes. The search for these deeper sources of success remains an 
intriguing and important challenge for future research. 
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Appendix A  
A Brief History of Alaska Native Land Claims 
 The legislative settlement of Native land claims was one of four major milestones in the 
evolution of property rights, resource scarcity, and political power in the territory that forms 
Alaska.36 To appreciate this evolution and to understand the initial conditions facing the Alaska 
Native people, it is useful to briefly review the history of the occupation and settlement of 
Alaska and the land claims process. 
A.1.  Alaska’s Native Peoples 
 Alaska’s indigenous peoples -- the Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians-- have continuously 
occupied and used the entire territory for about 8 to 10 thousand years. According to Chance 
(1990), the Aleuts and Eskimos are closely related linguistically and appear to be the most recent 
aboriginal arrivals from Asia, while the Indians moved up the pacific coast of North America and 
share linguistic ties with continental North American groups ranging from Canadian 
Athapaskans to the Apache and Navajo of the U.S. Southwest. At the time of European contact, 
there were about 70,000 Natives living in the territory (Arnold 1976, p. 8). Figure 9 shows the 
approximate distribution of these peoples. 
 Between 15,000 and 20,000 Aleuts lived in coastal villages on the lower Alaska 
Peninsula and Aleutian Island chain. They hunted marine mammals and gathered eggs, roots, and 
berries. In the 1700s Russian fur traders enslaved the Aleuts and exploited their labor in the 
harvesting of the rich populations of fur seals. This contact decimated the Aleut population. 
Through direct execution and the spread of infectious disease, their population had by the time of 
Russian departure in 1867 shrunk to only 2,000 people (Federal Field Committee 1968, pp.236-
238). 
                                                 
36The purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, the Statehood Act of 1959, and the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980 are the other major milestones in this evolution. 
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FIGURE 9: GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALASKA NATIVE PEOPLES 
 
 




 The Eskimos numbered about 40,000 and occupied the western and northern coastal 
mainland. The Inupiat occupied the north and were highly dependent on hunting marine 
mammals, especially whales. The Yup’iks lived in the coastal and upriver lowlands and based 
their subsistence economy on Salmon. 
 In the middle 1800s the New Bedford Whaling fleet ranged into the Arctic Ocean in 
search of dwindling whale stocks and established a physical and cultural presence among the 
Inupiat (northern) Eskimo. At Barrow and other northern villages, relations with whites were 
cordial, with substantial intermarriage between whalers and Inupiat women that is reflected in 
today’s family names. Apparently there were enough whales to go around for all, even though 
the Inupiat were highly dependent on the Bowhead for food, fuel, and ritual. 
 Finally, there were the Indians. Several thousand Athapaskans occupied the vast Alaska 
interior with a hunting and fishing society that included limited copper smelting technology. 
Their contact with Europeans was highly limited until the gold rush of the 1890s. In marked 
contrast, white traders had contacted the 12,000 Tlingit and Haida Indians along the coast of 
Southeast Alaska as early as 1780. These wealthy clans lived in an exceptionally resource-rich, 
temperate environment, and their trading savvy was widely known. Because they had traded with 
earlier Europeans for guns, they were able to fend off enslavement by the Russian-American 
Company when it established its monopoly trading position (and government) at Sitka in 1800. 
A.2.  Emerging Land Use Conflicts: 1867-1960 
 The Natives made heavy use of marine and fish resources as their staple foods, 
supplemented by roots and berries. Arriving Caucasians exploited fur seals, whales, and gold by 
1900. Notably absent from the list of economic opportunities in the Alaska territories were 
agriculture and manufacturing. Settlement was not a desired goal; there were only 550 Russians 
living in the territory when it was sold in 1867. Because the resources were either marine or (in 
the case of placer gold) widely scattered, and their extraction was extensive rather than intensive 
in land, there were few major conflicts between whalers or miners and Natives. With Southeast 
coastal salmon things were different as the Tlingits sought to defend some of their valuable 
salmon runs, with limited success. Other Salmon runs were not exploited by the Seattle-based 
commercial salmon industry until the early 20th century. 
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 In short, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, there seemed to be plenty of land 
and (with some exceptions) resources for all. This lack of perceived scarcity was reflected 
several times in the federal laws governing the territory of Alaska. At the time of purchase from 
Russia (1867), the Treaty of Cession simply lumped Alaska Natives in with the rest of the 
Indigenous U.S. Population.37 The Organic act of 188438 (setting out the governance structure for 
the territory) contained much stronger language protecting Native rights: 
The indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the 
possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed 
by them but the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such 
lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress.  
 Almost immediately, this language began to acquire economic and legal meaning, as the 
gold rush and then the commercial “salmon rush” led to serious encroachment on Native lands 
and food supplies. The Tlingit Indians bore the brunt of this new exploitation and organized legal 
protests and political action that culminated in the Tlingit and Haida lawsuit of 1936. This suit 
sought compensation for millions of acres of lands withdrawn by the federal government for the 
Tongass National Forest. 
 While the Tlingit-Haida claim was being adjudicated, the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 
further renewed a bland claim of continuing respect for Native rights established by use and 
occupancy39. But far more important was the Act’s direct assignment of more than 100 million 
acres in property rights to the new state. The Statehood Act required the State of Alaska to select, 
survey, and patent fully one third of the land base, and to select the most valuable lands it could 
discern for mineral leasing, agriculture, tourism, and other export industries. The theory was that 
devolving a secure resource base to the struggling State of Alaska would lead to its fiscal and 
economic autonomy and growth.40 This imminent hardening of property rights in an area with 
essentially zero existing private property signaled a major and rapid foreclosure of possible 
Native rights to these lands. 
 Shortly after statehood the Court of Claims finally decided the Tlingit-Haida case. The 
court held that the land withdrawal did in fact constitute a taking of formerly occupied lands and 
                                                 
37The Treaty of Cession stated: “The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United 
States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes in that country.” (quoted in Arnold 1976, p. 26) 
38 Act of May 17, 1884, 23 Stat. 24, section 8, quoted in Arnold 1976, p. 68. 
39The Act disclaimed the State’s rights to lands “the right or title to which may be held by Eskimos, Indians, or 
Aleuts.” (Arnold 1976 p. 91) 
40At the time, some scholars questioned this theory of economic determinism (Rogers 1962). 
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required compensation. But the compensation was finally established (8 years later) at only 50 
cents per acre based on nominal values as of the purchase from Russia in 1867. The decision 
shocked many Natives into the realization that established judicial channels would not bring 
meaningful amounts of land or even cash assets into Native hands. Yet it also provided an 
important legal precedent by accepting the link between traditional subsistence use and 
occupancy of vast land areas -- as opposed to fixed agricultural settlement -- and the lawful claim 
to that land. By this standard, the Natives had a valid claim to all of Alaska. 
A.3.  The Land Claims Struggle: 1960-1970 
 During the early 1960s the encroachments on traditional Native lands accelerated. World 
War II had brought a large influx of white people into the territory and established white 
settlement -- and hunting and fishing pressure -- at many heretofore-unoccupied places. 
However, it was the grand development schemes and increased enforcement of federal hunting 
restrictions that really alarmed the Natives. In 1961 the Atomic Energy Commission proposed 
using atomic weapons to blast a harbor out of the bluffs at Cape Krusenstern on the Northwest 
coast. Shortly thereafter, the Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers developed 
plans to build a huge dam on the Yukon river that would have flooded out many villages and 
subsistence habitats. 
Three Important Shocks. These regional conflicts might have remained isolated pockets 
of ineffective Native complaints in a vast territory but for three events that qualify as exogenous 
shocks to the Alaska economy. Two were technological, while the third was legal. 
 The first innovation was a dramatic increase in the human capital and communications 
technology available to the Natives. During the mid-1960s a new generation of college-educated 
leaders was just emerging from school. They had shared the high school experience together at 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Mt. Edgcumbe Boarding School in Sitka -- a sort of educational 
boot camp that took the best and the brightest and instilled in them both self-confidence and a 
sober realization of the Alaska Natives’ lot in life. This experience created an instant and 
unprecedented leadership class and a statewide network of personal relationships among these 
leaders. 
 62 
 Equally important, these leaders found a sympathetic source of private funding41 to 
support a statewide, Native-controlled newspaper, the Tundra Times. This newspaper was the 
first means of mass communication available to Alaska Natives, since at the time there was 
essentially no television reception, radio was dominated by localized commercial am 
broadcasters, and telephone connections were tenuous or nonexistent. Even this innovation 
would have been pointless were it not for the increasing literacy among the Native population 
generally. It is hard to underestimate the importance of this innovation in galvanizing the 
awareness and subsequent statewide political organization of the Native population in a land of 
scattered roadless villages. 
 The second shock to the system was an administrative legal action taken in 1966 by 
Interior Secretary Stuart Udall. Concerned that the 1884 Organic act had sidestepped the 
legitimate rights of the Natives, Udall placed a freeze on all transfers of disputed land. This 
action effectively halted all transfers to the State of Alaska and created immediate pressure for 
Congress to resolve the Native land claims issue. Although an administrative action, the freeze 
was extended past 1968 when Senator Henry Jackson agreed to give the Alaska Federation of 
Natives (AFN) veto power over President Nixon’s appointment of Walter Hickel as the new 
Interior Secretary. Hickel extended the land freeze as the price of his approval by AFN. 
 By 1968, then, the bargaining over Native land claims was finally shifted to Congress, 
the only body that could dispose of the issue at relatively low cost. Still, the terms would have 
been poorer and the resolution far slower had it not been for the third, decisive shock to the 
system. This was the discovery of the supergiant oil field at Prudhoe Bay. Located on land 
owned by the State of Alaska, the field was immediately estimated to contain more than 10 
billion barrels of recoverable reserves, producible at a rate equal to about 20% of existing U.S. 
oil production. 
The Importance of Prudhoe Bay. The petroleum shock dramatically raised the stakes of 
the bargaining game for all parties. Although the Natives never asserted title to the oilfield itself, 
the oil required transportation across 700 miles of contested federal lands to reach the ice-free 
port of Valdez.42 With daily production of 2 million barrels at stake, the discovery created an 
                                                 
41 Dr. Henry Forbes of Cambridge, Massachusetts (Arnold p. 99). 
42Other pipeline routes were considered. The leading candidate was an overland route through Canada to the 
Midwest. However, this option was ultimately judged too expensive and politically difficult. The consideration of 
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effective opportunity cost in lost rents of about $6 million per day. Because the field was located 
on state land, it promised billions of dollars in royalties as well as oil company profits. 
 Equally important, the Prudhoe discovery changed the perceptions of what a claims 
settlement could accomplish. Alaska, which had been poor, would now be rich. If there were 
additional sources of such huge rents lurking in everyone’s backyard, then the economic 
development problem was reduced to distributing endowments. The Natives could get rich too. 
Seeing the coming speculative boom fueled by such a huge discovery, many prescient 
businesspeople realized that putting land into Native hands was a far faster route to exploitation 
than leaving it in federal public domain or even passing it to the State. Business opposition to a 
settlement began to soften.  
 Most important, it was the oil shock that allowed the Native land claims movement to be 
merged, in the eyes of Congress, with the Native economic development problem. Alaska Native 
underdevelopment in 1968 was severe by any standard. Native unemployment ranged between 
50 and 60 percent in the fall and winter (Federal Field Committee 1968). The 1960 Census 
reported median per capita income for rural Natives at about $1,200, or only 25 percent of urban 
white income. Half of all Native children had not completed more than 6th grade, and only 8 
percent had completed high school (U.S. Census 1960). In 1960 Native life expectancy at birth 
averaged 60 years, ten years less than the U.S. average of 70 years (U.S. Public Health Service 
1967). In the socially tumultuous climate of the late 1960s, the Alaska Native land claims issue 
presented Congress and the nation with a chance to make more enlightened, or at least more 
compassionate, Indian policy than had been imposed on the tribes of the lower 48 states. 
 These three shocks-- new political technology, the land freeze, and huge but sterilized 
resource rents -- served to make Coasian bargaining over Native land claims possible. The 
legislative story has been well told by several authors.43 Most of the bargaining revolved around 
two questions: how much land, and how much money? Both quantities were decided through 
simple political assessments, proposals, and compromise. Of greater interest to economists, the 
structure of the settlement was hardly debated at all, although there were many major changes 
made to this structure throughout the process. In fact, major structural changes were introduced 
                                                                                                                                                             
this option, which would have avoided dealing with Native land claims, probably explains why oil company support 
for settling the issue was lukewarm at best until 1971. 
43Arnold (1976), Berry (1975), and Groh (1981) provide good accounts from different perspectives. 
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at the last minute to appease various interests and create compromise on what were perceived to 
be the larger issues. 
A.4.  The Settlement Act 
 ANCSA transferred 44 million acres of land and $962.5 million in cash to business 
corporations owned exclusively by Alaska Natives. The act established 12 regional corporations 
and approximately 200 village corporations. Each Alaska Native alive at the time of the act 
(December 17, 1971) was allowed to enroll in a village corporation, which choice automatically 
enrolled them in the corresponding regional corporation. Table 12 shows the wide variation in 
land areas and number of shareholders across regions. 
 
TABLE 12: ALASKA NATIVE REGIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Regional Initial
and Village ANCSA Major
Number of Land Area Cash Natural Resource 
Name Shareholders (million acres) ($ million) Endowments
Ahtna 1,100 1.7 6.4
Aleut 3,249 1.6 19.5
Arctic Slope 3,738 5.1 22.5 potential oil and gas
Bristol Bay 5,200 3.0 32.5
Bering Straits 6,200 2.2 38.1
Calista 13,306 7.0 80.1
Chugach Natives 2,109 1.0 11.5 timber
Cook Inlet 6,553 2.5 34.4 known oil and gas
Doyon 9,061 12.5 53.4 potential minerals
Koniag 3,731 1.7 20.0
NANA 5,000 2.2 28.9 zinc-lead deposits
Sealaska 15,700 0.3 92.5 old-growth timber
Total 74,947 40.8 439.9  
 
 The corporations were given substantial freedom in choosing and using their new 
endowments, consistent with Alaska corporation law. However, the Native shareholders could 
not sell their shares and the regional corporations had to share a portion of their natural resource 
rents with all other Native corporations on an equal per capita basis. 
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FIGURE 10: ALASKA REGIONAL CORPORATIONS 
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 The land transfer was straightforward. Village corporations received selection rights to 26 
million acres of proximate lands. The intent was to formally convey ancestral heritage and 
subsistence lands. It was widely recognized that 26 million acres was not enough land to provide 
for subsistence needs and that no fishing rights were included in the deal. 44 Regional 
corporations received all of the subsurface under village lands plus an additional 16 million acres 
in fee simple (surface and subsurface). 
 The Tlingit-Haida decision had established the principle of money compensation for 
lands taken. Secretary Udall came up with the idea of tying the money settlement to future 
federal petroleum leasing revenues from outer continental shelf (OCS) lands off the Alaska coast 
as a way of making the compensation politically palatable. The Prudhoe Bay discovery probably 
made this tapping of prospective new revenues seem like a painless proposition. The final figure 
of $962.5 million was a last-minute compromise; the basic amount of $1 billion appears to have 
been pulled out of thin air as a "nice round number"45 Everyone recognized that working capital 
would be needed for functioning business corporations.46 
 The regional corporations were required to incorporate as for-profits, while the village 
corporations had the option of incorporating as nonprofits. Almost none did.47The regional and 
village corporations each received 45 percent of the money settlement. The remaining 10 percent 
went to each individual enrolled Native. (Among other things, this immediate payment to 
individuals can be interpreted as a “sign-up bonus” to encourage people to enroll in a 
corporation.) 
A.5.  The Corporation as the Settlement Institution 
 One Inupiat Eskimo called them the “new Harpoon.”48 Why was the alien institution of 
the profit-making business corporation chosen as the principal repository for the Natives’ new 
                                                 
44 Subsistence rights were the subject of continuing bargaining culminating in additional rights in 1980. The 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 granted subsistence rights to rural (not Native) residents. 
The allocation of subsistence rights remains bitterly contested and unresolved. (Morehouse & Holleman 1994) 
45 Weinberg, Ed, Interview with Victor Fischer, 7/13/77, recorded in Fischer's unpublished mimeo "Legislative 
History: Structuring the Settlement." (page "r,"available from the author). Weinberg was a lead attorney for the 
Natives. 
46The $1 billion dollar amount was first broached in the Federal Field Committee’s (1968) report to Senator 
Jackson, Alaska Natives and the Land. The corporation concept was already well-established at the time. 
47Flanders (1996, personal communication, May 13) cites his own interviews in which Native leaders said that 
the for-profit structure offered more flexibility even if a nonprofit mission was to be embraced. 
48Charlie Edwardsen, in Edwardsen (1974). 
 67 
property rights? The use of the corporation as the settlement vehicle was a direct 
recommendation of the State of Alaska’s Land Claims Task Force. One legal scholar noted in a 
subsequent review that 
The legislative history of ANCSA does not contain any significant 
discussion of the use of corporations to implement the settlement. The 
1968 report of the Federal Field Commission recommended use of 
corporations, and all subsequent legislative proposals followed that model. 
(Bass, 1984, p. 4) 
 Recent research by Mitchell (forthcoming), based on extensive interviews with primary 
actors, traces the corporation concept to Barry Jackson, a staff attorney for the Alaska Federation 
of Natives, who drafted the Natives’ proposed bill for the Task Force. Jackson claims he adopted 
the concept based on a widespread distaste for other alternatives -- especially IRA49 corporations 
and other entities controlled by the BIA – and based on the formally egalitarian structure of 
shareholders’ rights. But the deliberate vagueness that the corporate form offered was clearly a 
reason why it was embraced by all sides. 
 Assimilationists saw in corporations business dealings and modern capitalism. Tribalists 
saw more real autonomy and, in any event, an improvement over the reservation system. New 
Native political leaders saw the opportunity for economic and political self-determination, not to 
mention the promise of management positions for themselves. The corporation offered a 
beguilingly simple vehicle for settling the thorny land claims issue. It allowed all parties to feel 
comfortable with their vision of the legislation. 
 Although the overall corporation concept was adopted early in the game, there was 
significant debate about how the corporations would be structured. Many early versions of the 
claims bill called for a statewide investment corporation to own the subsurface and control much 
of the working capital. The Alaska Federation of Natives early on opposed this concept and 
fought vigorously for regional corporations. They had learned from bitter experience how hard it 
was to hold together a statewide political coalition among disparate Native groups. Native 
leaders had invested heavily in region-specific political capital. 
                                                 
49 Indian Reorganization Act (of 1934) 
 68 
A.6. Special Features of the ANCSA Corporations 
 In many ways the ANCSA bundle of property rights was quite straightforward. However, 
three special features of ANCSA were highly unconventional, with potentially serious 
implications for economic efficiency. 
 First, shareholders could not sell their stock for at least 20 years. This prohibition 
removed the threat of takeover as a powerful discipline mechanism and eliminated the actual 
takeover as a corrective mechanism. With no takeover threat and no information feedback from a 
market in shares, finance theory suggests that shareholders would be forced to substitute a host 
of higher-cost and less effective monitoring activities. Inalienability also blocks individuals’ 
attempts to diversify which creates artificial demand for corporate diversification (Karpoff and 
Rice 1989) and stifles productive but risky investment (Fama & Jensen 1985). It creates 
problems for shareholders facing liquidity constraints, a condition that certainly applied to many 
poor Alaska Natives. 
 The second potentially serious feature of ANCSA was the requirement of section 7(i) that 
regional corporations share 70 percent of the "net revenue" from subsurface and timber resource 
sales with all other corporations, both regional and village. This provision created standard 
incentives to shelter resource rent income. It was also poorly drafted and invited costly litigation 
during implementation.50 
 Third, corporate management was given complete control over an essentially public good  
-- the land -- that was highly valued by individual shareholders. This tied the security of the land 
base to the control of the Board of Directors and ultimately to the voting power of the stock. 
Under this structure, allowing stock sales would invite free riding on the communally owned 
land and increase the incentives for individual Natives to sell out. Fearing this outcome, few 
would vote to allow stock sales. 
A.7.  Other Initial Conditions Faced by the Natives 
 Section 2 of ANCSA specified that the settlement was to address the “real social and 
economic needs” of Alaska Natives. Those needs in 1971 were compelling. The Natives at the 
time were poor and illiquid. This created pressure for early dividends. They had little formal 
                                                 
50 The definition of "net revenue" was litigated for 10 years before being settled out of court. 
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education. This lack of human capital meant that internal management talent was scarce and the 
Board’s monitoring ability low. The Native people lived on the economic periphery of a 
peripheral region. 
 Countering these pessimistic conditions as the corporations were formed in 1972 was 
Alaska’s new-found oil wealth. The Transalaska Pipeline System (TAPS) was finally approved 
in 1973 after the first OPEC oil shock. The resulting increase in oil prices fueled a speculative 
resource exploration boom throughout the State just as the Native corporations began to select 
their lands. Also of great importance was the continuing flow of federal money from the rest of 
the United States. Alaska Natives retained their specific eligibility for federal Indian programs 
and their status as U.S. citizens gave them access to all the social programs and infrastructure 
subsidies of the world’s richest nation. This favorable economic climate allowed the ANCSA 
corporations substantial freedom to concentrate on profitable investments without facing 
overwhelming pressure for immediate distribution of wealth. 
 
 
Appendix B  
Data Appendix 
The regional corporation data form a complete panel for 12 corporations over the 18 years from 
1976 to 1993. The starting year of 1977 is the first year of useful data on assets allocations, 
because the asset allocations from the end-of-year balance sheet are used in the regressions as 
beginning-of-year allocations for the following year.  
Financial performance data 
I developed the data on financial performance directly from the corporation annual reports. The 
data were adjusted to remove windfall transfers and the sales of natural resource assets, as 
described in detail in Essay #1. The basic data series that results from these adjustments is a set 
of annual returns on book equity resulting from business and passive financial investment. This I 
call nonwindfall income  
Allocation of assets to sectors 
Using the assets side of the corporate balance sheet as a starting point, I first excluded trade 
receivables, which are usually balanced on the liability side by trade payables, and other general 
assets such as the corporate headquarters building, if owned. I then allocated all invested assets 
to specific identifiable business ventures, such as "fishing vessels," "equity in oilfield catering 
venture," or "inventory at local hardware store." To minimize potential coding bias, I made no 
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attempt at this stage to aggregate the allocated assets into the broad categories used in the 
regressions. After all the assets had been allocated to specific businesses for all corporations and 
all years, I returned to the top of the dataset and classified each business venture as primarily 
serving one of the following sectors:  
 
Oil Sector. The Oil sector includes existing oil operations and enterprises dependent on the flow 
of oil and cash from the large and profitable North Slope fields. These include activities such as 
contract drilling, oilfield services, running the electric power plant or the sewage plant at 
Prudhoe Bay, security services aong the pipeline, and pipeline or construction camp catering. It 
does not include speculative investment in unproven leases or investment in infrastructure to 
serve speculative demand in an unexplored area. These ventures were be coded as "statewide." 
 
Statewide Sector. The business ventures coded as statewide span a wide potential range of 
industries that actually included everything from mobile home sales to dog food manufacturing. 
They are distinguished from the "local" sector by the geographic dispersion of demand. For 
example, a fish processing venture confined to one plant in one town is still a statewide venture, 
because the product is sold into external markets. Heavily represented statewide industries 
include construction, real estate, fish processing, active logging (value added beyond stumpage), 
and tourism (hotels). Also included is speculative entry into unproven oil and gas operations, eg, 
a venture not dependent on the cash flow generated by the Prudhoe Bay field and funneled 
through the major oil companies. Generally, construction was coded as a statewide business.  
 
Local Sector. The local sector is distinguished by the local and largely private sources of 
demand. It would include such ventures as renting apartments or offices, retail trade, or strictly 
local tourism services, such as a small hotel in a village. The local sector offers a potentially 
higher degree of monopoly power (in part because of small market size, locally increasing 
returns, and cultural loyalty to the Native provider). Competition is minimal in most cases, but 
the truly local market is also limited because almost by their nature any business activities 
supported by exogenous demand will face statewide competition. 
 
Local Public Works. I created a separate sector called local public works to reflect construction 
(and some other services such as fuel distribution) for which the source of demand is local 
government and competitive bidding is either not used or is attenuated by local preferences that 
vastly favored the Native corporation. In practice, this sector only applied to the Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation, which was favored by the demands of the regional Native-controlled 
government of the North Slope Borough. Throughout the study period, the Borough controlled 
essentially unlimited wealth due to its property taxing authority over the North Slope oil fields. 
 
Passive Financial. This sector includes investments in broad portfolios of stocks and bonds, as 
well as long-term interest-bearing notes receivable. There is an unfortunate grey zone that arises 
in the numerous cases where physical business assets were sold on payment terms, and were thus 
converted to a note receivable. In many cases these assets had been losing money, and in some 
cases the new buyer was similarly unable to make them perform, thus defaulting on the 
associated debt. For the most part, however, the notes from these asset sales paid interest at 




The resulting mean values (across corporations) of the allocation fractions are shown in 
Table A-1. 
Asset allocation to joint ventures 
Data limitations. Standard accounting practice shows JV participation in two ways. When the 
Native corporation is a minority participant, its equity in the JV is typically shown as a specific 
net asset. This is the equity method of accounting and it is supposed to be reserved for those 
projects over which the corporation has little management control. When the Native corporation 
is the majority participant, the entire project is typically listed as an asset and the partner's equity 
is shown as a liability. This is the standard, or cost method.  In both cases the data are biased 
downward compared to the true measure of the fraction of assets that is under some form of joint 
management. In the minority case, the use of a pure equity stake as a measure excludes the 
associated debt and thus understates the "size" of the project. In the majority case, the minority 
participant's equity stake similarly understates the size of the project. Furthermore, the 
accounting data give no indication of which partner is actually managing the project, although 
generally accepted accounting principles urge that projects over which the corporation has 
substantial management control be carried at cost. 
 
Minority-share joint ventures. I coded individual assets in minority-stake joint ventures from 
information in the notes to the financial statements. Almost all annual reports contain summary 
balance sheet and income data for assets invested in joint ventures and affiliates. I allocated each 
asset into the JV_OIL, JV_STATE, or JV_LOCAL "sectors". according to the rules described 
above for allocating total assets. 
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TABLE B-1: MEANS OF ASSET ALLOCATION FRACTIONS 
 
passive established non-oil local local
investment oil sector statewide enterprise public works
year (PASSIVE) (OIL) (STATEWIDE) (LOCAL) (PUBWORKS)
1976 0.29 0.05 0.50 0.11 0.05
[.20] [.08] [.33] [.15] [.16]
1977 0.27 0.05 0.50 0.14 0.04
[.19] [.09] [.27] [.16] [.14]
1978 0.25 0.08 0.54 0.11 0.02
[.20] [.13] [.30] [.15] [.07]
1979 0.27 0.08 0.55 0.09 0.01
[.19] [.16] [.29] [.12] [.05]
1980 0.50 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.01
[.21] [.14] [.25] [.05] [.02]
1981 0.44 0.08 0.44 0.03 0.01
[.19] [.15] [.22] [.04] [.04]
1982 0.34 0.11 0.50 0.03 0.02
[.21] [.15] [.26] [.04] [.05]
1983 0.38 0.10 0.47 0.04 0.01
[.21] [.14] [.25] [.06] [.04]
1984 0.39 0.09 0.46 0.05 0.01
[.21] [.14] [.26] [.09] [.05]
1985 0.29 0.11 0.54 0.04 0.02
[.17] [.17] [.29] [.07] [.07]
1986 0.38 0.12 0.46 0.02 0.02
[.25] [.19] [.31] [.02] [.07]
1987 0.48 0.11 0.38 0.01 0.02
[.24] [.15] [.28] [.02] [.06]
1988 0.56 0.10 0.31 0.01 0.02
[.26] [.12] [.26] [.01] [.07]
1989 0.54 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.02
[.25] [.13] [.26] [.01] [.08]
1990 0.58 0.10 0.28 0.01 0.02
[.25] [.13] [.24] [.01] [.07]
1991 0.61 0.10 0.26 0.01 0.02
[.24] [.11] [.23] [.03] [.05]
1992 0.58 0.10 0.29 0.01 0.02
[.25] [.10] [.25] [.03] [.05]





Internal (all-Native) joint ventures. There were not many of these operations. The most 
important was a statewide bank owned by a group of regional corporations. Another consortium 
bought and held speculative oil leases.  
 
 73 
Majority-share joint ventures. To conserve degrees of freedom, I lumped all majority-share JV 
assets into one category without regard for the underlying sector. The Doyon corporation's oil 
drilling operation was a majority-stake JV for many years and the data from these assets form a 
large part of the total in this category. 
 
Estimates of Native Corporation Shareholder Payroll 
 
Published data on shareholder employment and wages are available only incidentally and from a 
variety of scattered sources including annual reports, special studies (Waring 1989, McDowell 
1985), and the business trade press.(Alaska Business Monthly 1986-1993, Alaska Business and 
Industry, 1976-1982) To buttress these data I conducted a mail survey soliciting employment 
data for 1991, 1984, and 1976. I filled in the remaining gaps using a variety of proxies, trends, 
and extrapolations. These can be characterized as variations on the "jobs method" and the 
"payroll method." 
 
The "jobs method" consists of estimating numbers of jobs and then earnings per job. The chief 
challenges are (1) imputing seasonality to the many jobs that are clearly not full-time and (2) 
imputing an appropriate wage. I used rules of thumb to impute seasonality (chiefly in the 
construction and fishing industries) and published data on wage levels by industry and year to 
impute monthly wages.  
 
The "payroll method" uses payroll data directly. These data are available less often. The major 
challenge here is to impute the correct fraction of a firm's total payroll to its shareholder-
workers. This is complicated by the fact that many shareholders appear to work fewer months 
per year than their nonshareholder peers within the same company. For example, certain 
corporation fish-processing operations employed more than one hundred shareholders, but only 
for several weeks. Variations on the payroll method were sometimes available. Some 
corporations report contributions to defined-contribution pension plans. In other cases anecdotal 
data points on payroll could be tied to accounting data on expenses. The accounting data could 
then be extrapolated through time until another firm estimate was available. 
